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Product Liability and Game Theory: One More Trip 
to the Choice-of-Law Well 
Michael I. Krauss∗ 
Modern scholarship defends the view that current choice-of-law trends 
are conducive to a balanced approach to product liability law, in 
which each state’s substantive law is unlikely to favor plaintiffs or 
defendants. This article takes issue with that scholarship. Using the 
insights of game theory, this article explains why American product 
liability law under current choice-of-law constraints results in 
systematic and increasingly pro-plaintiff adjudication. Federalizing 
the substantive law is the usual remedy offered for Prisoner’s Dilemma 
problems in the states. This article criticizes the idea of preemptive 
substantive federal product liability law and proposes in its stead a 
federal choice-of-law rule developed either legislatively or by the courts. 
A federal choice-of-law rule, if correctly crafted, would be both 
compatible with constitutional mandates and conducive to the 
resolution of the game theoretic problem. Several possible federal 
choice-of-law rules are examined, but only one, a “law of first retail 
sale” rule, passes the needed constitutional and game-theoretic 
musters. Practical and jurisprudential implications of this rule are 
also fleshed out in the article. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Life in America is less risky, by any objective account, than it has 
ever been: we have proportionately fewer accidents, and live longer 
lives, than in the past.1 Yet the business of tort law, which forcibly 
reallocates certain kinds of risks, is thriving as never before. This is 
especially true for that subset of tort law that is product liability.2 
This article contends that much of the expansion of product 
liability3 is quite possibly not due to increased misfeasance by 
defendants or to increased risk-aversion by plaintiffs. Rather, this 
expansion may be the product, to a significant extent, of a beggar-
thy-neighbor4 legal arrangement intrinsically biased in favor of 
certain classes of local plaintiffs suing certain classes of out-of-state 
defendants.5 This inequity results from the unwitting creation of 
what is known in game-theoretical terminology as a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma. This Prisoner’s Dilemma has arguably played out as sub-
optimal liability across the country. 
This article identifies the game-theoretic dilemma, criticizes 
recent scholarship that misidentifies one of its causes as one of its 
cures, and sketches the parameters and implications of an effective 
structural solution. The proposed solution, unlike many substantive 
tort reform plans,6 has the advantage of preserving state jurisdiction 
over tort law. In addition to its Occam’s Razor characteristics, the 
 
 1. AARON WILDAVSKY, SEARCHING FOR SAFETY 7 (1988). 
 2. See ROBERT W. STURGIS, TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, TORT COSTS TRENDS: 
AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1995). But see Marc Galanter, Shadow Play: The Fabled 
Menace of Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1, 5–11 (arguing that the concern over high 
awards is misplaced). Galanter’s article and other similar works tend to focus on punitive 
damages, which are not at the heart of this article. For a telling quantitative rebuttal of 
defenses of current punitive damages rules, see Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., On 
the Determinants and Importance of Punitive Damage Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 527, 540–45 
(1999) (suggesting that punitive damage awards vary in an arbitrary manner). 
 3. In this article, “product liability” refers to legal recourse when an alleged defect in a 
tangible product causes property damage or personal injury. 
 4. In beggar-thy-neighbor arrangements, collective action fails because of each party’s 
temptation to free-ride on the efforts of others. See generally ANTHONY DE JASAY, SOCIAL 
CONTRACT, FREE RIDE (1989). 
 5. Professor Michael W. McConnell made this basic point in A Choice-of-Law Approach 
to Products-Liability Reform, in 37 PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. NO. 1, at 90 (Walter Olson ed., 
1988). Professor McConnell’s initiative inspired this research project. 
 6. See, e.g., Product Liability Reform Act of 1997, S. 648, 105th Cong. § 2(a)(2) 
(1997) (listing “[e]xcessive, unpredictable, and often arbitrary damage awards” as a factor 
motivating the bill). 
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proposal avoids many coordination and knowledge problems that 
otherwise might prove insoluble. 
Part II of this article traces the modern upsurge in product 
awards and contrasts the predicament of product liability with the 
prevailing situation in other areas of tort law. Part II goes on to 
explain how this predicament is likely a manifestation of a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, particularly in light of the peculiar confluence of the Erie 
Railroad doctrine and its progeny. 
Part III shows how current state-based product liability law, 
accompanied by the two generic choice-of-law rules currently 
prevailing in the states, exacerbates the dilemma instead of resolving 
it. As a central feature of this part of the article, Part III considers an 
influential theme of current legal scholarship, which holds that the 
dominant American choice-of-law rule is helpful in resolving the 
game-theoretic problem. This article squarely rebuts that thesis. As a 
result of this refutation, recent trends in product liability law are 
easier to understand and, it is contended, are finally amenable to 
solution. 
Having established both the existence and the cause of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, the article explains in Part IV why federal 
preemption of product liability law is not the best way to resolve it. 
Part IV also contests the claim that an imposed “libertarian rule” 
(i.e., a federal statute disallowing all “inalienable”7 state regimes, 
thereby in effect mandating freedom of contract in matters of 
product liability law), proposed by at least one law-and-economics 
scholar,8 would be an appropriate remedy. 
Part V makes the case for a federal choice-of-law solution to the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Several alternative choice-of-law rules are 
examined through two filters—that of constitutional legitimacy and 
that of game-theoretic efficacy. Though each choice-of-law option 
offers some advantage, only one, a federal “state of first retail sale” 
rule, seems to effectively meet legitimacy concerns while 
simultaneously resolving the product liability Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
Competing proposals, it turns out, tend to sacrifice one or the other 
of these concerns. 
 
 7. On “inalienability,” or mandatory legal rules, in general, see Michael I. Krauss, 
Property Rules vs. Liability Rules, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 782 
(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000). 
 8. See, e.g., PAUL H. RUBIN, TORT REFORM BY CONTRACT (1993). 
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But no reform is without risks. Part V goes on to explore 
prospective shortcomings of the “state of first retail sale” rule. The 
article finds none of these deficiencies to be fatal to its successful 
implementation, though some require some tinkering with its basic 
modalities. Then again, the implementation of the “first retail sale” 
choice-of-law rule would require adjustments to several ancillary 
areas of the law—federal diversity jurisdiction primary among them. 
These adjustments are detailed in the last section of Part V. A brief 
conclusion follows in Part VI. 
II. STATE PRODUCT LIABILITY AND NATIONAL MARKETS: A 
PRISONER’S DILEMMA 
The “tort crisis” has arguably affected different areas of tort law 
differently. In this Part, an explanation will be offered for this uneven 
evolution of tort law. Product liability law, unlike some other areas 
of tort, will be shown to suffer from a particularly acute Prisoner’s 
Dilemma. 
A. The Liability Upsurge 
Many people, both inside and outside the legal community,9 feel 
that all of tort law, not just that component of it covering liability for 
defective products, is out of control. Reliable data on the expansion 
of tort liability in America is hard to come by, in part because the 
overwhelming majority of filed tort suits settle before trial and 
verdict.10 Several serious estimates of the growth of tort have 
 
 9. See PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE (1994); WALTER K. 
OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION (1991); PATRICK M. GARRY, A NATION OF 
ADVERSARIES: HOW THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION IS SHAPING AMERICA (1997). 
 10. Only about two to three percent of filed tort suits ever make it to trial. In fiscal year 
1996–97, the most recent for which Department of Justice statistics are available, 47,221 tort 
cases were resolved in some way in federal courts. Of these, only 1516, or about three percent, 
were decided by jury or bench trial. Marika F.X. Litras & Carol J. DeFrances, U.S. DEP’T 
JUSTICE, Federal Tort Trials and Verdicts, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, Feb. 
1999, at 2 [hereinafter Federal Tort Trials]. Statistics are similar in state courts. In the nation’s 
seventy-five largest counties in 1996, the most recent year for which Department of Justice 
statistics are available, only two percent of tort cases were disposed of in court. These 
dispositions included jury and bench decisions as well as directed verdicts and judgments non 
obstante veredicto. Carol J. DeFrances & Marika F.X. Litras, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, Civil Trial 
Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN (Civil Justice 
Survey of State Courts, Washington D.C.), Sept. 1999, at 2 [hereinafter Civil Trial Cases]. 
Many settlements are, of course, confidential and therefore never reported. 
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nonetheless been attempted. One thorough study reckoned that 
between 1930 and 1994 the total cost of tort liability in America 
grew at a pace almost four times greater than the rate of growth of 
the economy.11 Though it was already near crisis in the mid-1980s,12 
from 1984 to 1994 alone tort liability in America increased by 
125%.13 In Alabama, the average punitive damages verdict in one 
small rural county increased to $12.9 million from 1989 to 1996.14 
Tort outlays (including the costs of litigation) now consume 
upwards of 2.6% of gross product, according to another report.15 
The number of tort suits filed in state courts does seem to have 
leveled off,16 but record awards in individual cases are set almost 
every year. The year 2000 witnessed a staggering $145 billion award 
in Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,17 a Florida class action lawsuit 
against tobacco companies. Nor was Engle a Y2K anomaly. While 
 
 11. See STURGIS, supra note 2. 
 12. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 
72 VA. L. REV. 139 (1986) (claiming that our civil litigation system is near a crisis point). 
 13. STURGIS, supra note 2; see also Health Care Liability Alliance, U.S. Tort Cost Growth 
Rate Slows: Tort System in U.S. Still Most Expensive in Industrial World, at http:// 
www.hcla.org/html/tillhast.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2002); STURGIS, supra note 2, app. 2, 
available at http://www.hcla.org/tortno.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2002) (table of tort system 
costs from 1975 to 1994). 
 14. Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1554, Fairness in Punitive 
Damages Awards Act, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Professor George L. Priest), 
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/oldsite/glpriest.htm [hereinafter Priest]. 
 15. See, e.g., BEACON HILL INSTITUTE, TAXATION BY LITIGATION: THE ECONOMICS 
OF CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN MASSACHUSETTS 2 (1997) (Tort costs 2.55% of state product in 
Massachusetts); STURGIS, supra note 2 (tort system cost 2.3% of gross domestic product, or 
$161 billion, in 1995). 
 16. See Steven K. Smith et al., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Tort Cases in Large Counties, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT # NCJ-153177 (Civil Justice Survey of State 
Courts, Washington D.C.), Apr. 1995, at 1. 
 17. 122 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1358 (S.D. Fla. 2000). The Engle damages award is the 
largest in U.S. history. This class-action lawsuit in a Florida state court was brought on behalf 
of all Florida smokers (estimated at 700,000) against tobacco companies. Id. The judgment, 
which has been appealed, has been harshly criticized for allowing the claims of such a diverse 
group to go forward and for the amount of the award. Defense lawyers claim that “reversible 
error was committed nearly every day” of the trial, during which the presiding judge admitted 
to being a member of the plaintiff class. See Big Gets Bigger: Husband-Wife Team Takes on the 
Tobacco Goliath and Walks Away with a Monster Jury Award, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 19, 2001, at 
C14. The trial judge upheld the entire $145 billion award, denying the defendants’ post-
verdict motions for remittitur, to set aside the verdict for a directed verdict, and to decertify 
the class. Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273 CA-22, 2000 WL 33534572 
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2000). Defendants have appealed the order denying the motions and 
upholding the award. See Big Gets Bigger, supra, at C14. 
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enormous awards remain rare exceptions,18 they are increasingly 
common. The total dollar value of 1999’s top ten awards was twelve 
times the 1997 amount—only the largest 1997 award would have 
made the 1999 “top ten” list. Every one of Lawyers Weekly USA’s 
“top ten verdicts of 1999” exceeded $100 million, and the top two 
verdicts surpassed $1 billion.19 Leading the 1999 list was a $4.9 
billion jury verdict against General Motors in a case where a GM 
vehicle burned after being rear-ended by a drunk driver traveling at 
70 mph.20 
The trend continued in 2001. The largest tort verdict that year 
was $3 billion, against cigarette maker Philip Morris, in Boeken v. 
Philip Morris, Inc.,21 a California suit.22 According to Lawyers Weekly 
USA, this verdict was larger than the ten largest non-class action 
awards in 2000 combined.23 Lawyers Weekly USA reported in 2001 
that the median top ten awards in the prior four years showed a 
“clear upward progression”—the leveling off in 2000 was simply 
unrepresentative.24 Tort awards are clearly growing in size, possibly 
exponentially, even after discounting for judges’ post-trial award 
reductions.25 
 
 18. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 623, 633–37 (1997) (stating that punitive damages are quite rare). 
 19. See Bill Ibelle, Murderers, Rapists and Terrorists Dominate Top Ten, LAW. WKLY. 
USA, Jan. 8, 2001, at B3–B4. The 1999 top verdict was $4.9 billion, the second largest in 
1999 was $1.2 billion, and the top verdict in 1998 was $1.5 billion. Id. at B3. Lawyers Weekly 
tracks verdicts to individual plaintiffs, omitting class action verdicts. Id. 
 20. Anderson v. Gen. Motors, No. BC 116926 (Super. Ct. L.A. Aug. 26, 2000); 
Margaret Cronin Fisk, The Biggest Jury Verdict of 1999: A Typical Verdict Last Year Was Way 
Up, But Nothing Like This One, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 28, 2000, at A1. 
 21. No. BC 226593 (Super. Ct. L.A. Aug. 9, 2001). 
 22. See Record Tobacco Verdict Tops Year’s Large Awards, LAW. WKLY. USA, Jan. 7, 
2002, at http://www.lawyersweeklyusa.com/usatopten2001.cfm. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Ibelle, supra note 19, at B4; see also Franklin Strier, Making Jury Trials More 
Truthful, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95, at 163 (1996) (arguing that unpredictable damage 
awards are increasingly perceived to damage American commerce). 
 25. Trial judges often reduce these jury awards through conditional remittitur decisions, 
ordering a new trial unless the plaintiff consents to take an amount the judge believes is the 
highest that an unbiased jury could have granted. Thus, Alabama rural punitive damage 
verdicts averaging $12.9 million are reduced to an average of $800,000 by the Alabama 
Supreme Court. See Priest, supra note 14. Appellate courts also reduce excessive trial court 
verdicts if they have no legal support. Nonetheless, the in terrorem effect of gigantic awards, 
which of course might not be reduced on appeal, inevitably impacts both settlement talks and, 
therefore, the proclivity to launch new lawsuits. And the documented evolution of judicial 
passivity in the face of lawless jury behavior gives reason for concern that revisions of jury 
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A losing tort defendant forfeits both the plaintiff’s award and the 
defendant’s own attorney’s fees and costs.26 Meanwhile, tort victims 
typically surrender from thirty-three to forty percent of any award to 
their attorneys and are also responsible for the costs of expert 
witnesses and the like. Indirect social costs (the opportunity cost of 
conscripted jurors’ time, judges’ salaries, etc.) add to the “load” of 
tort. Less than half the social cost of tort adjudication is likely to be 
converted into victim compensation.27 
Tort awards impact corporate defendants in particular ways. 
Depending on the elasticity of supply and demand for a firm’s 
products and for its factors of production, the cost of corporate tort 
liability is ultimately borne in varying degrees by employees, 
shareholders, and consumers of its products. Many observers believe 
there is a linear relationship between liability and safety—i.e., that 
increased corporate tort liability always produces greater safety at 
higher prices.28 But this belief is unfounded—increased liability 
increases neither consumer safety nor retail prices as a matter of 
course. To see this, recognize that in a competitive industry, if a firm 
is held liable for damages caused by a design or manufacturing flaw it 
could efficiently have avoided,29 it will not be able to recoup the 
amount of the tort award by increasing the price of its goods or 
 
verdicts are on the decline. See Renee Lettow Lerner, The Transformation of the American 
Civil Trial: The Silent Judge, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 195, 263–264 (2000) (exploring the 
history of judicial intervention in the jury process). 
 26. Defendants, of course, do not benefit from the contingency fee approach to legal 
expenses; by definition, there is no tort award given to a successful defendant. As a result, the 
cost of defense may play a role in settlement negotiations. See Jonathan T. Molot, How U.S. 
Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives, 73 IND. L.J. 59, 69–70 (1997) (explaining that while 
defendants must pay by the hour for their defense, contingent-fee arrangements enable 
plaintiffs to reduce the financial risks of litigation). 
 27. See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort 
Litigation System—And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1282–83; JAMES S. KAKALIK & 
NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION 67–68 (1986); 
Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort Awards, 42 
J.L. & ECON. 157, 172–73 (1999). 
 28. See, e.g., Ralph Nader & Joseph A. Page, Automobile-Design Liability and 
Compliance with Federal Standards, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 415, 458 (1996) (erroneously 
claiming that “[i]n the context of auto-design litigation, the [cost] of underdeterrence would 
be [life] and limbs, while [the cost of] overdeterrence would merely [be] a financial burden”). 
 29. If the defect could have been efficiently prevented, then the defendant is being held 
liable for negligence. The original formulation of this concept, the famous “Hand Formula,” 
may be found in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) 
(measuring the reasonable duty of care as a function of three variables: the probability that the 
harm will occur, the gravity of the resulting harm, and the burden of adequate precautions). 
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services above the competitive level. If the firm attempted to raise 
prices to recoup the costs of its negligence, competitors would 
undercut these prices, taking market share away from the negligent 
corporation.30 Prices will not increase, and the negligent firm will 
“eat” the liability award, i.e., suppliers of capital and labor will pick 
up the tab for the mistaken production decision. 
On the other hand, if liability is imposed for a product already 
laden with all cost-effective safety features, a tort award will affect 
corporate behavior somewhat differently. Liability might lead to the 
adoption of “wasteful” design modifications,31 or it might result in 
the bundling of a “tort insurance premium” as part of the price of an 
unchanged good.32 If juries impose the premium uniformly on all 
firms in an industry, costs and therefore the supply curve for the 
product will shift, and market price will obviously be affected.33 
Some design modifications made in order to minimize liability 
may be for the better. Surely it is beneficial for manufacturers to 
undertake cost-effective quality control. If tort liability is needed to 
provide the incentive to engage in this quality control because of 
some market imperfection, so be it.34 But many changes wrought by 
modern tort law are arguably contrary to the public interest. Fear of 
substantial, “bet the company” liability for certain risks of 
products—risks, in fact, exceedingly small or for some other reason 
 
 30. Whether or not the liability here is styled in “negligence” or in, say, “design defect,” 
if the claim is that the corporation should have (not merely “could have”) produced a better 
product, the claim is one of negligence. 
 31. Liability can lead to the adoption of safety measures that cost more than they save in 
accidents. 
 32. The choice between the addition of “idiot proofing” and the mere increase in 
pricing is complex, and depends inter alia on the firm’s guesses about future liability trends. 
 33. Uniform imposition of a “strict liability tax” would require that tort law be 
substantively identical across the country. See generally, Michael I. Krauss, Restoring the 
Boundary: Tort Law and the Right to Contract, CATO INST., POL’Y ANALYSIS 347 (1999) 
(suggesting the need to limit liability rules to their appropriate realm, allowing for contract to 
allocate voluntarily assumed risks). But tort rules should not be identical for populations with 
different risk preferences. As the present article shows, infra Part IV.C, there are good reasons 
to believe that national uniformity will be precluded for reasons that have nothing to do with 
heterogeneity of risk preference. 
 34. The profit motive, even absent any tort liability, furnishes appropriate design and 
manufacturing incentives to competitive producers—they will be able to reap profits by 
producing a better, read safer, widget. If, however, consumers are invincibly ignorant of design 
and manufacturing details, which concededly is occasionally the case, then, absent tort liability, 
no producer will find it worthwhile to adopt an efficient safety innovation. See A. MITCHELL 
POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 15–24 (1983). 
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not economically worth preventing—has undoubtedly led firms to 
avoid activity that might have achieved much social good.35 If 
liability increases enough, the result may be that it internalizes all 
the product’s risks and even more. A report in Science indicates 
that liability concerns have led some firms to delay research on an 
AIDS vaccine, while others have abandoned HIV research 
altogether.36 Bendectin, the only treatment proven effective 
against Nausea and Vomiting in Pregnancy (NVP),37 is no longer 
produced because the expected cost of defending against 
groundless tort suits38 was greater than the expected profits from 
this non-defective drug.39 
 
 35. This is because the company cannot internalize all the value it produces. Much of 
the social good produced by corporations takes the form of consumer surplus—consumers 
value the products they purchase more than the they value the money they use to make the 
purchase. This consumer surplus is not captured by the corporation, unless it can perfectly 
price-discriminate in selling its product. See, e.g., WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC 
THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 620–22 (6th ed. 1995) (explaining that “[i]f 
each buyer can be separately identified by a monopolist, it may be possible to charge each the 
maximum price he or she would willingly pay for the good. This strategy of perfect . . . price 
discrimination would then extract all available consumer surplus, leaving demanders as a group 
indifferent to buying the monopolist’s good or doing without it.”). But perfect price 
discrimination is rare and difficult to sustain. See id. (noting that “[p]erfect price discrimination 
poses a considerable information burden for the monopoly—it must know the demand for 
each potential buyer . . . [or at least meet the] less stringent requirement . . . [of] separate[ing] 
its buyers into relatively few identifiable markets . . . and pursue a separate monopoly pricing 
policy in each market.”); see also Ox SHY, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: THEORY AND 
APPLICATIONS 75 (1995) (“Note however, that in order to be able to charge consumers 
different prices, a firm must possess the means for making arbitrage . . . impossible.”). 
 36. Jon Cohen, Is Liability Slowing AIDS Vaccines?, SCIENCE, Apr. 10, 1992, at 168–69. 
 37. NVP is otherwise known as “morning sickness.” In its most extreme form, known as 
“hyperemesis gravid arum,” NVP can cause severe complications in pregnancies. See Richard 
Chudacoff, M.D., Hyperemesis Gravidarum, at http://www.surrogacy.com/medres/ 
article/hyperem.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2002). 
 38. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the manufacturer of Bendectin, lost one case in the 
District of Columbia, but the plaintiff’s judgment was ultimately thrown out and replaced with 
a j.n.o.v. for the defendant in Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Civ. No. 82-
1245, 1996 WL 680992, *35 (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 24., 1996). See also Raynor v. Merrell 
Pharm. Inc., 104 F.3d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (upholding trial court j.n.o.v.). Merrell Dow 
also lost one case in Texas, see Ellen Joan Pollock, Jury Orders Merrell Dow to Pay Couple $33.8 
Million in Suit over Nausea Drug, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1991, at B7, but this judgment was 
also reversed on appeal. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 
(Tex. 1997). 
 39. See, e.g., Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of 
Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 318–19 (1992). Since the manufacturer of Bendectin 
enjoyed a monopoly position, it was presumably able to extract much of the consumer surplus 
of the drug. That it nonetheless ceased manufacturing the drug is powerful circumstantial 
evidence of the excessiveness of liability. 
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Products never developed may not be consciously “missed,” 
though society is in fact less well off than it might have been even if 
citizens are unaware of gains they would have enjoyed.40 And we 
assuredly pay directly and indirectly for “excess liability” premiums as 
well as superfluous “safety” features, bundled with goods we 
purchase. Thus, power tools now carry arguably pointless warnings 
that no one reads but that all purchasers fund.41 The price of new 
extension ladders incorporates such a significant liability premium 
that many consumers continue to use rickety old versions.42 These 
liability premiums generate wasteful financial transfers.43 For some 
products, the amount of the premium built into the price of a 
product may be less than the state sales tax. In other cases, however, 
it may represent a substantial percentage of what would otherwise be 
the market-clearing price.44 
The alleged side effects of tort law extend beyond product 
liability, of course. It is argued that fear of excessive medical 
malpractice liability has caused doctors to order redundant and 
expensive diagnostic tests45 and operations46 that are not justifiable 
 
 40. See Michael I. Krauss, Loosening the Food and Drug Administration’s Drug 
Certification Monopoly: Implications for Tort Law and Consumer Welfare, 4 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 457 (1996), for a generalized study of the effects of this consumer ignorance. The 
technical problem is that consumer welfare losses are estimated using demand curves, which 
can be estimated reliably only for existing products. 
 41. See, e.g., John Heinzl, Wacky Warnings: The Best Common Sense Product Labels, 
GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 18, 2001, at B4; David Tarrant, Warning: Disbelief May Ensue, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Sept. 5, 2001, at 1C. 
 42. See Michael I. Krauss, Tort Law and Private Ordering, 35 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 623, 
648 (1991). 
 43. The transfer is wasteful because it in no way disciplines manufacturers or retailers for 
misfeasance but has as its sole purpose to transfer money from a “producer-insurer” to an 
injured “consumer-insured.” As discussed at supra text accompanying notes 27–35, transfer-
based liability is very expensive insurance that will either lead to excessive price increases or to 
inefficient design changes. 
 44. In the case of many vaccines, the transfer premium is clearly over 100%. See Richard 
L. Manning, Changing Rules in Tort Law and the Market for Childhood Vaccines, 37 J.L. & 
ECON. 247, 273 (1994); see also John P. Wilson, The Resolution of Legal Impediments to the 
Manufacture and Administration of an AIDS Vaccine, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 495, 513–14 
(1994) (citing ALAN R. NELSON, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS’N, IMPACT OF PRODUCT 
LIABILITY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 1 (1988)). 
 45. See Laura-Mae Baldwin et al., Defensive Medicine and Obstetrics, 274 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 1606, 1606–10 (1995); Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive 
Medicine?, 111 Q.J. ECON. 353, 359 (1996). 
 46. See Lisa Dubay et al., The Impact of Malpractice Fears on Cesarean Section Rates, 18 
J. HEALTH ECON. 491, 491–522 (1999). 
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on medical grounds. High malpractice insurance premiums are said 
to lead competent physicians to retire prematurely, leaving whole 
geographic areas underserved. But these claims are disputed—
notably, the refusal of state medical insurance cooperatives to 
establish claims-based premium structures is sometimes cited as the 
basis for the premature retirement problem.47 Indeed, very 
respectable academic literature suggests that there may be too little 
medical malpractice liability.48 
Whatever the truth is on this account, product liability suits, 
unlike medical malpractice and other areas of tort, are subject to an 
intrinsic bias that substantially increases the likelihood of 
unwarranted liability. The expansion of class action product 
litigation,49 as well as “creative” individual product liability lawsuits50 
has been remarkable. From automobiles51 to asbestos52 to breast 
 
 47. See Gary M. Fournier & Melayne Morgan McInnes, The Case for Experience Rating 
in Medical Malpractice Insurance: An Empirical Evaluation, 68 J. RISK & INS. 255, 274 
(2001) (physicians, especially rural obstetricians, are choosing to limit practice or self-insure 
rather than pay soaring premiums unrelated to their own claims experience); Editorial, Echo 
Malpractice Mess, CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL, Jan. 3, 2002, at P4A (physicians are 
leaving West Virginia because lawsuits are increasing the cost of insurance coverage); Ovetta 
Wiggins, Doctors to Protest Premium Increases, PHILA. INQUIRER, April 23, 2001, at B1 
(Pennsylvania Medical Society asserts that eleven percent of Pennsylvania physicians “have 
either moved out of state, retired [prematurely], or scaled back their practices [due to] 
‘skyrocketing’ malpractice insurance rates.”); Patricia Poist-Reilly, Malpractice Maelstrom: 
Skyrocketing Malpractice Insurance Premiums Have Doctors and Healthcare Professionals Here—
and Around the State—Clamoring For Reform, LANCASTER NEW ERA/INTELLIGENCER 
J./SUNDAY NEWS, Dec. 17, 2001, at 1 (high jury awards pushing up insurance rates and 
forcing physicians to retire early, move to more rate-friendly states, or limit patient access to 
medical care). 
 48. See, e.g., David M. Studdert et al., Can the United States Afford a “No-Fault” System 
of Compensation for Medical Injury?, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 33–34 (1997); Paul C. 
Weiler, Fixing the Tail: The Place of Malpractice in Health Care Reform, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 
1157, 1165 (1995); Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis—Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 
443, 448 (1987); PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, 
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 61–76 (1993); THE PROFESSIONS 
AND PUBLIC POLICY (Philip Slayton & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 1978). 
 49. See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz et al., Federal Courts Should Decide Interstate Class 
Actions: A Call for Federal Class Action Diversity Jurisdiction Reform, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
483, 488 (2000). 
 50. Illnesses and accidents that in the past would have been seen as the result of 
assumption of risk (e.g., smoking), or of contributory negligence (e.g., driving while inebriated 
and without buckling one’s seat belt), today result in the filing of lawsuits against the 
manufacturer who provided the cigarette, or who “allowed” the car to be driven without an 
automatic seat belt. 
 51. See George L. Priest, Understanding the Liability Crisis, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN 
LIABILITY LAW 196, 198 (Walter Olson ed., 1988). 
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implants53 to intrauterine devices54 to heart valves55 to prescription 
medicines56 to, most recently, cigarettes and firearms,57 
manufacturers have been exposed to relentless (and relentlessly 
increasing) liability claims. The Rand Corporation found that 
product liability suits comprise an ever-larger percentage of all 
federal tort litigation.58 The amount of damages has increased in 
tandem with the number of lawsuits: 31% of product liability claims 
in federal courts now result in awards in excess of one million dollars, 
nearly twice the frequency for non-product-related suits.59 Punitive 
damage awards are much more likely to be substantial in products 
cases.60 That product liability is becoming relatively more hazardous 
for defendants than other tort cases is not fortuitous. Upon 
examination, it appears that recent trends are in part a function of 
current choice-of-law rules. 
 
 52. See Linda S. Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation: Postaggregative Procedure in Asbestos 
Mass Tort Litigation, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 477 (1991). 
 53. See David L. Bernstein, The Breast Implant Fiasco, 87 CAL. L. REV. 457, 459–66 
(1999) (reviewing MARSHA ANGELL, THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN 
THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE (1996)). 
 54. See Sylvia A. Law, Tort Liability and the Availability of Contraceptive Drugs and 
Devices in the Unites States, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 339, 383 (1997). 
 55. See Attorneys in Heart Valve Case Awarded $10.25 Million, 10 INSIDE LITIG. 13, 13 
(1996). 
 56. See Paul D. Rheingold, Fen-Phen and Redux: A Tale of Three Drugs: The Story of 
How Fen-Phen and Redux Came to Be Used by 6 Million Americans Is Chilling, 34 JAN. TRIAL 
78, 78 (1998). 
 57. On the latter, see MICHAEL I. KRAUSS, FIRE AND SMOKE: GOVERNMENT, 
LAWSUITS AND THE RULE OF LAW (2000). 
 58. This statistic is currently at sixteen percent. Federal Tort Trials, supra note 10, at 3. 
 59. Id. at 5. 
 60. Civil Trial Cases, supra note 10, at 9 (punitive damages vastly more likely to exceed 
$250,000 in product liability cases than in all other categories of tort cases save medical 
malpractice); see also Michael L. Rustad, Unraveling Punitive Damages: Current Data and 
Further Inquiry, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 15, 29 (citing DEBORAH HENSLER & ERIK MOLLER, 
INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE (RAND), TRENDS IN PUNITIVE DAMAGES: PRELIMINARY DATA 
FROM COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS AND SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA (1995) (DRU-1014-
ICJ)); ERIK MOLLER, INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE (RAND), TRENDS IN CIVIL JURY VERDICTS 
SINCE 1985 (1996); ERIK MOLLER, INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE (RAND), TRENDS IN PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES: PRELIMINARY DATA FROM CALIFORNIA (1995) (DRU-1059-ICJ)) (While the 
overall incidence of punitive damages is small as a percentage of all jury awards, punitive 
damages are more frequent in business tort and intentional tort cases, are clustered in certain 
jurisdictions, and are rising overall.). 
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B. Goods, Services, and Choice of Law 
Some tort suits (for instance, automobile collision61 and 
professional malpractice cases) target services (driving, doctoring, 
lawyering, etc.) performed by a defendant. Lawsuits such as these 
typically pit an indigenous individual plaintiff against an indigenous 
individual defendant. When litigated before a local jury, this type of 
case creates no systemic predisposition against either party. What is 
sometimes termed a “public choice” problem62 is absent: the plaintiff 
cannot persuasively charge the jury to bring “outside” money into 
the locality without harming anyone locally. Other kinds of bias 
(against the social class, race, etc. of either party) are of course 
possible in these cases, as in all lawsuits. Race and class biases, 
although alarming and requiring remediation when they occur, are 
not intrinsic to a party’s status as plaintiff or defendant, however. In 
any case, parties can attempt to guard against these biases through 
challenges to the jury venire.63 
A second type of tort suit—exemplified by negligence claims 
invoking respondeat superior64—sets indigenous individual plaintiffs 
against indigenous corporate defendants. Because juries are 
composed only of individuals, corporate defendants might 
experience systemic prejudice here: a jury may be tempted to 
transfer wealth from an entity that does not “feel pain” to a 
physically suffering person with whom they can identify. On the 
other hand, such temptations may be offset by the jury’s desire to 
maintain employment and economic activity in their locality, 
especially if the defendant corporation maintains a large local 
presence. It is very hard to predict how these offsetting incentives 
will ultimately unfold in any given case: they might result in 
 
 61. According to a Department of Justice study, 31.9% of all state tort trials in the 
nation’s seventy-five largest counties involved automobile accidents. Civil Trial Cases, supra 
note 10, at 2. 
 62. “Public choice” problems, arising from the realization that money transfers from 
“the many” to “the few,” provoke more intense support from the “soaking few” than they do 
opposition from the “soaked many.” As a result, “rent-seeking,” such as inefficient transfers 
from the many to the few, will be heavily valued in the public arena in mass democracies. See 
JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 31–39 (1965). 
 63. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 88 (1986) (racial bias in jury selection violates 
equal protection clause). 
 64. Respondeat superior holds an employer vicariously liable for negligent behavior by an 
employee while on the job. Hern v. Nichols, 91 Eng. Rep. 256 (Ex. 1708). 
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corporate status, in and of itself, being of little consequence over 
the long run.65 
Early product liability suits tended to be of this second kind. 
Most products were manufactured near their place of consumption, 
as transportation costs made far-flung markets unreachable. Thus, 
many lawsuits concerning allegedly defective products set local 
individual plaintiffs against local corporate defendants.66 With the 
advent of “paradigm shifters”67 such as assembly-line production, 
interstate highways, and electronic auctions, markets for goods 
(though not services) have today become largely national. Modern 
product liability suits characteristically set an indigenous individual 
plaintiff against a corporate out-of-state defendant.68 
Christopher C. DeMuth of the American Enterprise Institute 
corroborated this trend by examining published New Jersey product 
liability cases in 1900 and at twenty-year intervals through 1980.69 
New Jersey is an “active” product liability state,70 and also a heavy  
 
 
 65. See Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under 
Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 408–09 (1992) (Attorneys 
responding to a survey indicated that out-of-state status was more frequently the cause of jury 
bias than corporate status or type of business.); Tabarrok & Helland, supra note 27, at 161–
64. 
 66. See, e.g., Osborne v. McMasters, 41 N.W. 543 (Minn. 1889) (early product liability 
suit against a local apothecary, who had mislabeled a drug, resulting in poisoning of the 
victim). 
 67. See 2 THOMAS J. KUHN, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNIFIED SCIENCE: 
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION (2d ed. 1970). 
 68. See Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial Decisionmaking in Federal Products Liability Cases, 
1978–1997, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 323, 326 (“Plaintiffs, their lawyers, and most other observers 
of the legal system believe the jury to be more sympathetic to plaintiffs, on average, than the 
judge. Plaintiffs therefore route a weaker set of cases to juries.”). 
 69. Christopher C. DeMuth, Should Product-Liability Law Be Nationalized? (Sept. 
1985) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 
 70. New Jersey has pioneered many shifts in favor of individual plaintiffs against 
corporate defendants. See, e.g., O’Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983) 
(superceded by statute); Roberts v. Rich Foods, Inc., 654 A.2d 1365 (N.J. 1995) (holding 
that a trespasser who dove into a four-foot deep, above-ground swimming pool could sue the 
manufacturer of that pool and that a court could declare that above-ground pools were all 
intrinsically defective); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1983) 
(holding that a manufacturer could be liable for a “defective” design even if no one in the 
world had a better design to offer); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 
1960) (holding that a waiver of the right to sue for a manufacturing defect in a new product 
was void). 
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manufacturing state.71 Thus, one would suppose that defendants in 
New Jersey product liability cases are more likely to be local than is 
the case elsewhere. DeMuth found that, even in New Jersey, there 
was an increasing tendency to sue out-of-state defendants: 
 
TABLE 172 
LOCATION OF MANUFACTURING FACILITIES FOR  
NEW JERSEY PRODUCTS CASES 
Period All Defendants Are 
In-State 
At Least One 
Defendant Is 
from Out-of-State 
1900-1901 
 
1 0 
1920-1921 
 
0 0 
1940-1941 
 
7 3 
1960-1961 
 
8 5 
 
This trend links product liability litigation to diversity 
jurisdiction. Exploration of this link reveals the importance of choice 
of law to the product liability issue. 
Although modern companies generally manufacture their 
products in a small number of locations, for national distribution, 
they are subject to more than fifty73 separate bodies of product 
liability law. Product liability law is not one of the named areas of 
federal competence under our Constitution.74 Like state tort law in 
general, and despite various legislative enactments, product liability 
law has its roots in the common law. It was not proclaimed ab nihilo  
 
 
 71. Production manufacturing per worker in New Jersey is twenty-five percent above 
the national average. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, tbl. 1231 (2000). 
 72. DeMuth, supra note 69, at 50. 
 73. Each of the fifty states, District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, etc., has its own 
rules. 
 74. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 3.1–3.3 
(5th ed. 1995). This is not to imply that federal preemption under a named legislative power, 
such as Interstate Commerce, is impossible. It is merely to assert that the default authority over 
product liability resides with the states. 
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by legislative bodies but “declared” and modified incrementally by 
state courts.75 
Lawsuits may be initiated in, or removed to, federal court even if 
they involve state law questions, provided that federal diversity 
jurisdiction exists. This will occur whenever a case implicates 
plaintiffs who are from different states than every defendant, if the 
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 per plaintiff.76 Following 
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,77 state substantive law governs 
product liability diversity suits tried in federal court. In Erie, the 
Supreme Court recognized that without preserving state law in such 
cases, federal diversity law would in effect nationalize areas of 
jurisdiction that were meant to be left to the states.78 In other words, 
federal diversity jurisdiction only provides procedural protection, not 
substantive uniformity. A citizen of one state has no fundamental 
right to be immune from the laws of other states. Diversity 
jurisdiction was not designed to authorize federal imposition of 
substantive solutions to legal problems.79 Rather, it was meant to 
assure out-of-state litigants that their state citizenship would not 
convey prejudice. 
Though various states’ rules may be similar on any given subject 
matter, the multiplicity of laws with which manufacturers must 
 
 75. See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural 
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1649–50 (1996). 
Louisiana and Puerto Rico, as civil law jurisdictions, derived tort law from basic doctrinal 
categories in a non-statutory way very similar to that of the common law. See 2 KONRAD 
ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW: THE INSTITUTIONS 
OF PRIVATE LAW 366–73 (Tony Wier trans., 2d ed. 1987). 
 76. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2002). In class actions as well, the jurisdictional minimum 
must be met on a per-plaintiff basis in most cases; aggregation of plaintiffs’ claims for the 
purpose of meeting the jurisdictional minimum is only permissible when plaintiffs “unite to 
enforce a single title or right, in which they have a common and undivided interest.” Zahn v. 
Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 294 (1973) (citing Troy Bank of Ind. v. G.A. Whitehead & 
Co., 222 U.S. 39, 40–41 (1911)). 
 77. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 78. Erie Railroad’s purpose was arguably to preserve a viable, principled private law 
system in which the laboratory of state laws survives and thrives. Supreme Court cases 
subsequent to Erie arguably unwittingly undermined this effort. This article briefly discusses 
the implications of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). See infra text 
accompanying notes 200–07. 
 79. This procedural protection has been substantially diminished by judicial 
interpretation of federal statutes, allowing state courts to retain jurisdiction unless diversity is 
complete (i.e., unless each plaintiff is from a different state from each defendant). A case study 
of this problem may be found in Michael I. Krauss, NAFTA Meets the American Torts Process: 
O’Keefe v. Loewen, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69 (2000). 
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reckon generates costs. In some subject areas, these costs may create 
inefficiencies, as has been noted by Judge Posner80 and by others.81 
Choice-of-law rules at times operate to exacerbate such inefficiencies, 
as will be shown below. In other areas, however, national 
corporations cope rather well with legislative diversity, from state 
highway codes (UPS trucks run in every state, doubling-up trailers in 
some and tripling them in others when permitted) to contract rules 
(Exxon/Mobil Corporation presumably deals with the mix of 
franchise laws with which it must comply).82 
The diversity of state product liability law might be thought 
equally advantageous. Justice Brandeis prominently recognized that 
states offer competing laboratories in which solutions to problems 
can be tried and tested: “It is one of the happy incidents of the 
federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”83 
Justice Brandeis suggests that the coexistence of different state 
laws would result in rewarding good laws and “weeding out” 
inefficient legislation. However, this can only be achieved if the 
structural context for the application of these laws allows for real 
competition among them. Unfortunately, for product liability rules, 
that does not prove to be the case. 
C. Product Liability Law and the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
In the typical product liability case, a consumer purchases a 
product, is allegedly injured while using it, and sues its 
manufacturer84 to recover damages resulting from that injury. Most 
 
 80. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 178 (1985). 
 81. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform 
State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 134–37 (1996). 
 82. Even though the Uniform Commercial Code is relatively standard, state variations 
exist; moreover, state common law still governs contracts for services. See also Jonathan R. 
Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a 
Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 267 (1990). 
 83. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
 84. The retailer may also be sued, but recovery is typically against the manufacturer; 
because the retailer is typically local, its inclusion as a codefendant may be used to destroy 
diversity and prevent removal to federal court. See, e.g., Guerrero v. Gen. Motors Corp., 892 F. 
Supp. 165, 166 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (local retailer’s presence as codefendant destroyed diversity, 
even though this was sole factor preventing removal). 
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purchases take place close to the home; almost all product use takes 
place near the home or the workplace;85 and no state is home to a 
majority of manufacturers’ head offices or factories. The concurrence 
of these factors suggests that the typical product liability suit is 
initiated by a plaintiff who has been injured in her home state, which 
is typically also the state in which the allegedly defective product was 
purchased. In the vast majority of cases, however, the product was 
designed and manufactured in another state. 
Assume for a moment that the victim sues in her home state, that 
this forum state’s court agrees it has personal jurisdiction over the 
suit, and that it concludes that its own substantive product liability 
law applies to resolve the dispute.86 Such a suit would pit an 
indigenous plaintiff against an out-of-state corporate defendant, in 
the local plaintiff’s court and subject to the local plaintiff’s state law. 
The fact that a lawsuit is initiated in a local court by a local plaintiff 
against a “foreign” defendant does not imply that the law applied to 
the lawsuit will be unreasonable. After all, laws of the forum state 
must apply equally to in- and out-of-state defendant manufacturers 
(under pain of constitutional sanction).87 
Consider, however, a scenario in which the forum state’s product 
liability rules are ambiguous in some way that bears on the dispute at  
hand.88 Assume, for example, that a defendant in a product liability 
suit offers a legal argument that is powerful, but not clearly 
 
 85. Even for automobiles, most driving almost certainly takes place near one’s home and 
in one’s state of residence. 
 86. Whether the case proceeds in state court or whether the defendant manufacturer 
removes the case to federal court on diversity grounds, the federal court will apply the forum 
state’s substantive law to the dispute. In any case, removal to a federal court currently can be 
(and often is) prevented with ease, merely by joining a local defendant (say, the retailer) to the 
lawsuit. This joining destroys “complete diversity,” and thus precludes removal under current 
interpretations of federal law. See Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 187 (1990); 
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). 
 87. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3; City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 617, 
626–27 (1978) (under the Commerce Clause, out-of-state and in-state goods must be treated 
the same, “unless there is some reason apart from their origin to treat them differently”); New 
England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 331, 339 (1982) (New Hampshire 
could not, consistent with the Commerce Clause, restrict the sale of power to within its own 
borders.). But see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 131, 151 (1986) (upholding a state’s ban on 
importation of fish on grounds that the state “retains broad regulatory authority to protect the 
health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of its natural resource”) (citing Baldwin v. 
G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935)). 
 88. Those cases that make it to appellate courts often involve a “penumbra” in the law. 
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 100–23 (2d ed. 1994). 
3KRA FIN 11/15/2002 7:50 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
778 
dispositive, and that if the forum court agreed with this argument it 
would take the case from the jury and declare the local plaintiff’s suit 
groundless. At the margin, will the local judge be tempted to transfer 
wealth in-state by rejecting this argument, thereby (to the extent the 
case has precedential value) creating a product liability regime with a 
vaguely more pro-plaintiff posture? Of course, the previous legal rule 
may well have been optimal; if it was, then the incremental move 
now made would leave the state’s law in a relatively inefficient state.89 
To illustrate, the previous state of the law might have 
incorporated a consumer misuse defense, the functional equivalent of 
tort law’s contributory or comparative negligence defenses. Under 
the consumer misuse defense, plaintiffs injured by defective products 
they have misused may not recover, or their recovery may be 
reduced.90 This defense is arguably desirable, inter alia, to minimize 
moral hazard91 by imparting appropriate incentives to consumers. 
After all, joint care (in manufacture and in use of a product) is clearly 
needed to minimize the social costs of accidents. But what standard 
will be used to measure consumer misuse? Should the plaintiff’s 
misuse be fatal to her case if it was foreseeable by the manufacturer? 
Should it matter whether the misuse was drunk driving, or traveling 
at 100 mph, or not fastening one’s seat belt, or all of the above?92 
What if the considerable cost of this misuse can be shifted to 
shareholders, workers, and consumers across the nation93 while the 
immediate benefit of the shift in state law accrues to a plaintiff 
located inside the state? A local plaintiff will be highly motivated to 
 
 89. If the previous state of the law was suboptimal, then it should have been changed, 
regardless of the citizenship of the parties to the dispute. 
 90. See, e.g., Venezia v. Miller Brewing Co., 626 F.2d 188, 192 (1st Cir. 1980) (“Even 
under the most expansive theories of products liability, a ‘manufacturer is not an insurer and 
cannot be held to a standard of duty of guarding against all possible types of accidents and 
injuries’ in any way causally related to the design and manufacture of its products.”); see also 
Francis H. Bolen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort, 53 U. PA. L. REV. 
337, 343 (1905) (a purchaser who subjects an article to a use for which it is unfit and unsafe is 
liable for his own injury therefrom). 
 91. When an allocation of risks increases the likelihood of the risk materializing, a moral 
hazard is created. An extreme example is the insured’s incentive to burn his home when he has 
been allowed to insure it for an amount greater than its market value. 
 92. See, e.g., Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 495 A.2d 348, 356–57 (Md. 1985) 
(plaintiff whose inside-out nightgown touched a stove burner and ignited while she was 
making tea had used the nightgown for a reasonably foreseeable purpose, though possibly 
careless). 
 93. See supra text accompanying notes 28–30. 
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nudge the “consumer misuse” defense toward an arguably non-
optimal social result, requiring precious little care on her part but 
expensive redundancy in design. Would the local judge, and the local 
jury, be tempted to join with the plaintiff in this enterprise? 
Chief Justice Richard Neely of the West Virginia Supreme Court 
disclosed in a 1988 book that he was disposed to adjust product 
liability rules in precisely this way whenever such an adjustment 
would transfer money into West Virginia.94 Justice Neely did not 
merely raise this issue theoretically—he “walked the walk,” 
implementing his reasoning in Blankenship v. General Motors Corp.95 
Blankenship was a “crashworthiness,” or “secondary collision” 
case in which the West Virginia Supreme Court adopted a pro-
plaintiff rule even though it found the defendant’s argument more 
sensible.96 A plaintiff who had negligently caused his GM vehicle to 
crash alleged that its poor design aggravated the injuries suffered in 
the collision. It is of course always possible to allege some defect or 
other in any vehicle’s design. In “crashworthiness” cases the typical 
plaintiff’s difficulty is establishing “cause in fact”—i.e., 
demonstrating the extent to which the purportedly defective 
automobile design actually worsened her injury. Since no crash can 
be replicated exactly, it is hard for the plaintiff to establish how a 
“well-designed” car would have fared during this precise collision. 
Sometimes the plaintiff appeals to a “perfect car” that could 
withstand this (and perhaps most any) crash. In that case, what 
should the court do if this perfect car is not in fact currently made by 
any manufacturer? 
Two general approaches to the problem of secondary collisions 
had emerged in pre-Blankenship case law across the country: 
 
• One “school,” following Huddell v. Levin,97 required the 
plaintiff to “offer proof of an alternative, safer design, 
practicable under the circumstances . . . [and] of what 
injuries, if any, would have resulted had the alternative, 
safer design been used.”98 In practice this might require 
 
 94. RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS: HOW BUSINESS CAN BE 
RESCUED FROM THE POLITICS OF STATE COURTS (1988). 
 95. 406 S.E.2d 781 (W. Va. 1991). 
 96. Id. 
 97. 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976). 
 98. Id. at 737. 
3KRA FIN 11/15/2002 7:50 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
780 
the (expensive) creation and testing of prototypes 
equipped as the plaintiff advocates. Failing such proof, 
Huddell holds that plaintiff may not reach the jury with 
her design defect claim. 
• The second approach, which follows Mitchell v. 
Volkswagenwerk, AG,99 shifts to the defendant the burden 
of proving that the alternative design is not feasible, or 
would not have reduced injuries. Any such proof would 
be rebuttable by the plaintiff, who would therefore be 
assured to the jury on this issue, as long as he/she 
located one “expert” who states that a better design 
would have prevented her injury. 
 
Acknowledging Huddell as more efficient, because it minimized 
the chance that the judicial system would engage in uninformed 
second-guessing of design standards in a competitive market,100 the 
West Virginia Supreme Court in Blankenship nonetheless opted for 
Mitchell.101 The court justified its position on the ground that West 
Virginia consumers were, as a practical matter, already paying 
markups every time a new car was purchased in West Virginia to 
reflect inefficient liability payouts to plaintiffs in those states that had 
adopted Mitchell.102 Justice Neely reasoned that West Virginians 
might as well derive benefit from the inefficient rule, since 
consumers in other states would be paying most of its cost.103 Aware 
of the implications of his idea, Justice Neely went on to announce 
that henceforth, “in any crashworthiness case where there is a split of 
authority on any issue, . . . we [will] adopt the rule that is most 
liberal to the plaintiff.”104 
The dilemma sketched by Justice Neely, and empirically 
confirmed by Eric Helland and Alex Tabarrok,105 is an illustration of 
 
 99. 669 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1982). 
 100. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 74–76 
(1972). 
 101. Blankenship, 406 S.E.2d at 786. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 785–86. 
 105. Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Exporting Tort Awards, 23 REGULATION, NO. 
2, at 21 (2000). The authors found that elected state judges are biased against out-of-state 
corporate defendants. They found no such bias in federal diversity actions. 
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the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma of game theory.106 A Prisoner’s 
Dilemma is a predicament in which a number of individuals, acting 
independently, are each rationally impelled to make choices that, 
when combined with the other individuals’ equally rational choices, 
generate a very poor outcome for each individual.107 
This particular Prisoner’s Dilemma springs from the fact that 
local plaintiffs and out-of-state corporate defendants are typically 
combatants in a product liability suit. If each state’s judicial system 
crafted efficient product liability rules, commerce among the states 
would be facilitated, investment decisions would not be skewed by 
liability concerns, in many other ways costs of doing business would 
be lowered, and national consumer surplus would be maximized. 
This is represented by the upper-left-hand box in Table 2 below. 
Imagine that all states had such even-handed rules. In that case, 
any individual state could extract profits (“rents”) for local residents 
by “defecting,” i.e., by adopting rules that exploit defendants, most 
of which are located out-of-state. If all states had such exploitative 
rules, of course, then costs of production would be needlessly high, 
investment decisions would be distorted, and consumer surplus 
would be lowered. 
The temptation to defect from an efficient to an inefficient rule is 
illustrated in Table 2, which imagines a simple scenario with two 
states, A and B:108 
 
 106. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). 
 107. Prisoner’s Dilemma refers to a simple illustration of the problem, in which two partners in 
crime are interrogated separately by the police. If each suspect keeps quiet, both will get light 
punishments, since the police have little evidence. Suppose, though, that each prisoner is told that 
she will get off without any punishment (but her accomplice will get the maximum) if she implicates 
the accomplice and the latter remains silent. On the other hand, if the accomplice rats the suspect 
out while she stays silent, the reverse scenario will occur. Finally, if both accomplices confess, each 
will get a heavy punishment (though less than “the max”). Schematically, the dilemma looks like this 
(figures in brackets representing years in prison for A and B, respectively): 
 
 B keeps silent B “gives it up” 
A keeps silent 2, 2 10, 0 
A “gives it up” 0, 10 7, 7 
 
In this case, each prisoner has an incentive to confess and implicate her partner, provoking the 
worst collective outcome for the two suspects. Police routinely exploit this dilemma—acting 
individually without guarantees about the other’s behavior, A and B are each led to confess, 
though after they do this, they are each in an inferior situation from their own perspectives. 
 108. To conceptualize this nationally, state A might be the forum state, while state B 
might be all other states. 
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TABLE 2 
PRISONER’S DILEMMA AS CONCEPTUALIZED BY JUSTICE NEELY 
State B → [2d payout] 
State A ↓ [1st payout] Legally Neutral, 
Optimal Rule 
Rule that Exploits 
Out-of-State 
Defendant 
Legally Neutral, 
Optimal Rule 
 
40, 40 -10, 55 
Rule that Exploits 
Out-of-State 
Defendant 
55, -10 5, 5 
 
The matrix demonstrates that state A optimizes its own reward (the 
first number in the pair), regardless of what state B does, if state A 
adopts a rule which exploits out-of-state defendants. (The absolute 
numbers are arbitrary—other rank-preserving figures would also 
illustrate the dilemma.) If state B has a neutral rule, state A’s payoff 
increases from 40 to 55 by adopting a discriminatory rule. If state B has a 
discriminatory rule, state A increases its payoff from -10 to 5 by 
discriminating in turn. If states A and B cooperate, promising to adopt 
neutral rules for mutual benefit, state A’s agents have incentives to defect 
from the agreement. It turns out that state B has identical incentives. 
State A is better off adopting a discriminatory rule no matter which 
rule B in fact adopts, even though the exploitative rule by A causes a net 
social loss (of 35, given the figures in the table) when compared to 
neutral rules for both states.109 State B has symmetrical incentives to 
adopt a discriminatory rule no matter which rule A adopts. The 
expected (“dominant”) outcome is thus the lower right-hand corner, in 
which both states have adopted exploitative, non-efficient rules. This 
result is “Pareto-inferior”110 to the upper left-hand corner outcome, 
which maximizes benefits. 
A product liability Prisoner’s Dilemma is unlikely to be 
neutralized by industrialization in contemporary America. Even in 
 
 109. Total payoff in top left box: 80 (40 + 40). Total payoff in bottom left box: 45 (55 –10). 
 110. A Pareto-inferior position is one in which a reallocation could be made that would 
hurt no one and help at least one party. In other words, the bottom right hand box is worse 
from each party’s subjective perspective (absent bizarre envy or some similar pathology). See 
HENRY N. BUTLER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 77 (1998) (explaining the concept of 
Pareto efficiency as subsuming the premise of subjective evaluation of welfare). 
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populous and highly industrialized states like New Jersey, the great 
majority of products consumed are produced outside the 
jurisdiction, and the majority of products produced are destined for 
out-of-state consumption.111 Under such conditions, courts will have 
an incentive to provide “Equal Protection” by exploiting both in-
state and out-of-state manufacturers. As will be shown below, such 
behavior will not (contrary to intuition, and to influential recent 
scholarship) jeopardize the attractiveness of the state as a site for 
manufacturing.112 The fact that New Jersey has arguably blazed a 
trail in product liability “innovations,”113 yet has been successful in 
attracting manufacturing facilities, is eloquent corroboration of the 
vitality of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
Nor is the dilemma likely to be resolved by state legislative 
action. For reasons analogous to those underlying the common law 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, state legislatures are unlikely to adopt rules 
clarifying product liability doctrines in ways favorable to out-of-state 
interests.114 In fact, the bulk of substantive legislative tort reform has 
concerned matters such as automobile accidents and medical 
malpractice, both of which tend to involve in-state defendants.115 
Note, finally, that this legal Prisoner’s Dilemma implicates both 
the selection of the law applicable to an individual case and the 
interpretation of that law. One would expect to see more adverse 
interpretations of the same law against out-of-state defendants than 
against in-state defendants. This tendency is likely exacerbated in 
 
 111. This is not the case for some localized products, e.g., milk in some states. If such 
products have distinguishing characteristics, then this would give way to a testable 
hypothesis—that liability rules for such products would implement these characteristics and 
tend to be less exploitative. 
 112. See infra text accompanying notes 134–37. 
 113. See supra note 70. 
 114. See Ricard A. Epstein, The Political Economy of Product Liability Reform, 78 AM. 
ECON. REV. 311, 311–15 (1988). 
 115. See generally, e.g., NANCY K. BANNON, AMA TORT REFORM COMPENDIUM (1989) 
(detailing tort reforms currently in effect, almost none of which are related to product 
liability); American Tort Reform Association, Tort Reform Record, at http:// 
www.atra.org/wrap/files.cgi/7469_record602.htm (June 30, 2002) (Six of forty-five pages of 
tort reforms relate to product liability. Though fifty states have enacted tort reform of one kind 
or another, only seventeen states have enacted any kind of reform relating to product liability. 
Note that one of these states (California) in September 2002 abrogated its only product 
liability reform. Many of the other sixteen states have minimal reforms, for example relating to 
affidavits. The overwhelming majority of the “reforms” listed under product liability are minor 
and superficial.). 
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jurisdictions where judges are elected and must run for contested re-
election.116 
III. PRICE DISCRIMINATION: A RESOLUTION OF  
THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA 
Chief Justice Neely’s beggar-thy-neighbor strategy, which Alex 
Tabarrok’s preliminary data indicates is replicated nationwide, 
depends crucially on the existence of a national market for products. 
For it is only if price increases in, say, Virginia and Maryland help 
absorb the cost of inefficient rulings in West Virginia that the Neely 
strategy can succeed. Current product liability law would not create a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma if manufacturers could durably price products 
differently from state to state, as a function, inter alia, of the costs 
(including liability costs) of doing business in that particular state. If 
state price discrimination were possible, each state would have a 
greater incentive to conduct its legal business as if in an “autarky,” 
i.e., as if it internalized the consequences of its legal decisions.117 
 The matrices of Table 2 would be quite different in an autarky, 
since any inefficient legal change by courts (or legislatures) in state A 
would result in increased prices in that jurisdiction only. Because the 
costs of A’s legal change could not be directly externalized to other 
states,118 state A would have little strategic interest in making the 
change. If the costs of discriminating against out-of-state firms were 
essentially internalized, then given the figures used in Table 1 above, 
the results of state A’s or state B’s adoption of an inefficient pro-local 
plaintiff rule are reflected in the following matrix: 
 
 
 116. See Tabarrok & Helland, supra note 27, at 163. 
 117. See McConnell, supra note 5, at 97. Of course, price discrimination would not really 
establish absolute autarky. See infra Part V.C.2.a. 
 118. It is important to realize that even in an autarkical state, A’s legal rules might still 
indirectly impact other states. Thus, depending on the elasticity of demand for products, 
increased local liability in state A could result in increased prices in state A, decreased amount 
demanded in state A, therefore increased unemployment in state B (the state of manufacture), 
decreased tax base in state B, etc. Alternatively, if state A had a large population, a liability 
increase in that state might result in a national design modification instead of a localized price 
increase, if there are significant manufacturing economies of scale. This type of externality is, 
arguably, not morally objectionable; unlike Justice Neely’s strategy, state A’s legal change was 
not intentionally accomplished in order to subsidize consumers in state A by consumers in 
other states. Indeed, this kind of externality is in fact commonplace—every time we purchase 
something, we increase demand for it slightly, and thus increase the price others must pay 
marginally. 
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TABLE 3 
AUTARKICAL INCENTIVES 
↔ State B (Second Number) 
↓ State A  [1st 
number] 
Legally Neutral, 
Optimal Rule 
Rule that Exploits 
Out-of-State 
Defendant 
Legally Neutral, 
Optimal Rule 
 
40, 40 40, 5 
Rule that Exploits 
Out-of-State 
Defendant 
5, 40 5, 5 
 
 In this scenario, which uses the same payout amounts as in Table 
2, neither state A nor state B has an incentive to adopt an inefficient 
rule hostile to out-of-state defendants.119 
Substantive product liability rules are in a sense the dependent 
variables here. One important independent variable is the choice-of-
law rule implemented in the state—what substantive rule of law is 
applied by a court in a multi-jurisdictional product dispute? If the 
choice-of-law rule allows a state to externalize the costs of its judicial 
decision, it is wanting under this analysis. If on the other hand the 
choice-of-law rule is conducive to autarky, then it is acceptable. 
Unfortunately, as the next section indicates, neither of the two basic 
types of choice-of-law rules currently in force in the states (and 
therefore also in federal courts)120 passes muster. 
A. Autarky and Existing Choice-of-Law Rules 
1. Lex loci delictus 
Consider the traditional choice-of-law rule for torts.121 That rule, 
styled lex loci delictus, provides that the substantive law of the state in 
which a tortious act occurs governs any lawsuit arising from the tort.  
 
 
 119. To the extent that each state would see its own shareholders and employees affected 
by its decision, see supra text accompanying note 28, the disincentive would be exacerbated. 
 120. See infra text accompanying Part IV. 
 121. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934). 
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Since a tort cannot exist absent injury,122 lex loci essentially applies 
the law of the place of injury to determine liability. 
Suppose that a consumer in state A travels to state B to purchase 
a product manufactured in state C. The consumer then returns home 
to use the product in state A. If the product’s use results in injury to 
the consumer, who then sues the manufacturer, courts in state A will 
both assume jurisdiction and (if they abide by lex loci) apply the 
substantive product liability law of state A to determine whether the 
manufacturer is liable for the injury.123 Courts in other states, if they 
had personal jurisdiction for some reason, would of course also apply 
state A’s substantive product liability law if they followed lex loci. 
If courts everywhere adopted lex loci delictus, then they would all 
apply the laws of state A to regulate accidents occurring in state A 
and the laws of state B to govern accidents occurring in state B. It 
might seem that an “autarkical” situation exists in such a situation. 
Consumers in state A would, one might argue, have to pay “A 
prices” for their goods, while consumers in state B paid “B prices,” 
each set of prices reflecting inter alia a given “liability premium.” 
Despite the façade of autarky, however, arbitrage will preclude a 
resolution to the Prisoner’s Dilemma under lex loci. Arbitrage is 
implemented by out-of-state purchase. 
Imagine that state B has product liability rules that favor 
defendants, as compared with those of state A. Say a manufacturer 
decides to charge higher prices for goods wholesaled in state A, in 
order to cover the “premium”;124 it must pay for unavoidable liability 
there.125 If this happened, consumers in state A could simply 
purchase their products at lower cost from merchants in state B. Lex 
loci provides that the law of state A applies to all accidents occurring 
in state A, regardless of the location of retail sale. Thus, consumers 
in A would obtain the same tort “coverage” for a lower premium if 
 
 122. At least this is so for unintentional torts. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (5th ed. 1984). 
 123. See, e.g., Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 752 A.2d 200, 230–33 (Md. 2000) 
(Maryland applies the lex loci delicti rule in all tort actions as set forth in the First Restatement, 
and the place of the harm is defined as the place of the last action contributing thereto.). 
 124. This premium may be a literal insurance premium, or it may be a reserve set aside by 
a self-insuring manufacturer to cover expected liability costs. 
 125. As stated earlier, prices will increase to reflect liability costs only if those costs do not 
represent cost-efficient design or manufacturing changes. For efficiently avoidable liability, i.e., 
negligence, a manufacturer will simply not be able to pass costs on in a competitive market. See 
supra text accompanying note 28–30. 
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they purchase their product in state B instead of shopping in their 
home state, A. Manufacturers will not be able to adjust the price of 
goods sold in state B, to reflect B’s less stringent product liability 
rules, because lower-priced goods sold in state B may incur the 
higher liability of state A. Lex loci delictus, in sum, does not allow for 
segregation of these distinct liability risk pools into distinct premium 
pools. Insurance theory leads us to predict that this inability to 
segregate risk pools will lead to avoidance of the insurance premium 
by higher risk insureds.126 Lex loci is therefore not conducive to an 
autarkical solution. 
Might lex loci at least tend, at the margin, to encourage 
manufacturers to leave high-liability state A and relocate to low-
liability state B? If such a tendency existed, and if by hypothesis the 
efficient liability level was that chosen by state B, then this would 
alter incentives, perhaps sufficiently to resolve the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma. Alas, there is no reason to believe an inducement to 
relocate is created by lex loci delictus. After all, under this rule a 
manufacturer’s liability in no way depends on the location of its 
manufacturing facilities. A manufacturer’s exposure to liability for 
accidents occurring in state A will be the same, whether its product 
is produced in state A or in some other state. Indeed, if state A 
believes it is successfully siphoning money from other states through 
beggar-thy-neighbor product liability rules, as Justice Neely’s 
strategy implies, it might choose to use part of its “rent” to subsidize 
manufacturers to locate or remain there.127 If this happens, lex loci 
might indirectly discourage plant location in low-liability locations. 
In sum, under lex loci delictus the dominant strategy in states A 
and B would tend to be Justice Neely’s: a consistently and 
increasingly more stringent product liability régime than national 
and state welfare would mandate. Anecdotally, the impossibility of 
reacting to product liability distortions by changing manufacturing 
sites or tailoring wholesale prices to new legal developments is borne 
out: prices are essentially uniform throughout the country, and high-
liability states continue to attract industry.128 
 
 126.  See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE 
L.J. 1521, 1540–41 (1987). 
 127. If lawyers and plaintiffs capture the entire “rent” from the Neely strategy, this bribe 
could be accomplished through a tax on tort income or on tort contingent fees. 
 128. Mercedes Benz had no reason not to locate its car plant in high-liability Alabama—
its liability for Alabama accidents is the same regardless of where its factories are based. Some 
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2. “Interest analysis” 129 
As a choice-of-law rule, lex loci delictus has been supplanted by 
“interest analysis” in a majority of states.130 Under “interest analysis,” 
spurred by the work of Brainerd Currie,131 the forum court 
determines which substantive law to apply to a multi-jurisdictional 
dispute by ascertaining which state has the greatest “interest” in 
determining the outcome of the case.132 Using “interest analysis” 
notably allows a forum state to apply its own law to accidents 
 
high-liability states (California, New Jersey) are heavily industrialized, while others (West 
Virginia, Alabama) are much less so. Clearly liability rules are not determinants of factory 
location. Of course, adoption of extreme product liability rules might be a sign of a general 
anti-business climate, which would deter relocation. But then it would be this climate, not the 
product liability choice of law rule, that repelled investors. 
 129. This section groups together states that have abandoned the lex loci rule of the First 
Restatement. Technically, these states might be strict “interest analysis” states, or they might 
have adopted the Second Restatement, which refers to “interests” and other factors in making 
“most significant relationship” decisions. This essay groups these states together, following the 
view that both “modern” approaches tend to favor forum law more frequently than does the 
traditional lex loci rule, and that neither is particularly discernible from the other in practice. 
See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 357, 358 (1992); Michael E. Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of 
Choice-of-Law, 24 GA. L. REV. 49, 51 (1989) (states grouped as “lex loci” or “modern 
theories” jurisdictions). 
 130. See Russell J. Weintraub, Choice of Law for Products Liability: Demagnetizing the 
United States Forum, 52 ARK. L. REV. 157, 163–64 n.29 (1999); RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, 
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 319–21 (3d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1991) (listing 
thirty-five states, plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, that have adopted the 
“modern” approach); see also Ehredt v. DeHavilland Aircraft Co. of Canada Ltd., 705 P.2d 
446 (Alaska 1985); Bryant v. Silverman, 703 P.2d 1190 (Ariz. 1985); First Nat’l Bank in Fort 
Collins v. Rostek, 514 P.2d 314 (Colo. 1973); O’Connor v. O’Connor, 519 A.2d 13 (Conn. 
1986); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Lake, 594 A.2d 38, 47 (Del. 1991); Bishop v. Fla. Specialty 
Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980); Johnson v. Pischke, 700 P.2d 19 (Idaho 1985); 
Ingersoll v. Klein, 262 N.E.2d 593 (Ill. 1970); Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 
1071 (Ind. 1987); Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968); Lee v. Ford Motor Co., 
457 So. 2d 193 (La. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 461 So. 2d 319 (La. 1984); Adams v. 
Buffalo Forge Co., 443 A.2d 932 (Me. 1982); Pevoski v. Pevoski, 358 N.E.2d 416 (Mass. 
1976); Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969); Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 
(Miss. 1969); Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 995 P.2d 1002 (Mont. 2000); Harper v. Silva, 
399 N.W.2d 826 (Neb. 1987); Motenko v. MGM Dist., Inc., 921 P.2d 933 (Nev. 1996); 
Morgan v. Biro Mfg. Co., 474 N.E.2d 286 (Ohio 1984); Brickner v. Gooden, 525 P.2d 632 
(Okla. 1974); Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng’g Co., 428 P.2d 898 (Or. 1967); Hataway v. 
McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53, 59 (Tenn. 1992); Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 
1979); Amiot v. Ames, 693 A.2d 675 (Vt. 1997); Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 555 P.2d 
997 (Wash. 1976). 
 131. BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963). 
 132. Id. at 189. 
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occurring outside its boundaries.133 Theoretically, “interest analysis” 
also allows a forum state to decline to apply its own law to accidents 
occurring inside its boundaries.134 
Courts typically use “interest analysis” to conclude that the 
forum state’s “interest” in compensating its own citizens for injuries 
suffered while they are out-of-state exceeds the “interest” of the lex 
loci state in determining the juridical consequences of events 
occurring inside its own borders.135 Such “protection” is of course 
only required if the lex loci state happens to have liability rules that 
favor the defendant. Thus, “interest analysis” is often used to further 
exploit out-of-state parties, i.e., to exacerbate the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma. 
In a provocative article,136 Professor Bruce Hay asserts, to the 
contrary, that the rise of “interest analysis” actually helps neutralize 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma created by lex loci because it encourages 
manufacturers to locate in low-liability areas. A succinct version of 
Hay’s argument follows:137 
 
• Assume state A, whose rules result in extensive 
manufacturers’ liability, and state B, a more pro-
defendant jurisdiction. Assume that the conflicts rule in 
state A is lex loci delictus. As discussed above, 
manufacturers are unable to price their products 
differentially in states A and B to reflect liability potential 
 
 133. See, e.g., Hataway, 830 S.W.2d at 60 (concluding that the occurrence of a diving 
accident in Arkansas was merely a “fortuitous circumstance” and holding that Tennessee’s (the 
forum’s) law should apply to the accident, since other states would similarly have applied their 
own law). 
 134. This is exceedingly rare—courts invariably use interest analysis to extend the reach of 
their substantive law. For a rare instance where a forum used interest analysis to parochially 
decline to apply its own law, see Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 683–
85 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1985) (applying a New Jersey charitable immunity rule to dismiss a suit by a 
New Jersey plaintiff for sexual abuse committed in New York and New Jersey by an employee 
of a New Jersey corporate defendant, even though New York law contained no charitable 
immunity exception). 
 135. See, e.g., Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 995 P.2d 1002, 1015 (Mont. 2000) (auto 
accident occurred in Kansas in a vehicle purchased in North Carolina; Montana court asserts 
that it has a supreme interest in allowing Montana plaintiffs to avail themselves of Montana’s 
uniquely pro-plaintiff rules in order to recover from non-Montana defendant). 
 136. Bruce L. Hay, Conflicts of Law and State Competition in the Product Liability System, 
80 GEO. L.J. 617 (1992). 
 137. Id. at 627–31. 
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in each state because of the adverse selection caused by 
arbitrage.138 
• It has already been shown that under lex loci 
manufacturers have no incentive to relocate their 
plants.139 But under “interest analysis,” as long as the 
state of manufacture constitutes one additional “interest” 
favoring the application of that state’s law, then at the 
margin this would tip the scales in favor of applying the 
law of the state of manufacture. 
• For instance, a citizen of pro-defendant state B, injured 
in state B by a product manufactured in pro-plaintiff state 
A, might under “interest analysis” persuade the courts of 
state B to invoke the product liability rules of state A.140 
But if the manufacturer were to relocate to state B, there 
would be no grounds at all for courts in B to apply state 
A’s laws to this case. Thus “interest analysis”, at the 
margin, encourages firms to relocate to low-liability 
states. This helps counteract the local court’s natural 
tendency to favor a local plaintiff. 
 
Professor Hay correctly concludes that a ready-made empirical 
test for his hypothesis about the effects of “interest analysis” already 
exists.141 If he is correct, then states with low manufacturer liability 
will tend to abandon lex loci delictus over time and adopt “interest 
analysis” as their choice-of-law rule as a way to lure manufacturers 
into their jurisdiction.142 Courts with pro-plaintiff product liability 
rules would, on the other hand, be expected to stick with lex loci. 
Honorably falling on his sword, Professor Hay admits that his 
test fails—his hypothesis is rebutted by “facts on the ground.” States 
that have adopted “interest analysis” tend to be high-liability states 
wishing to promote recovery by their own citizens for accidents 
occurring in less pro-plaintiff jurisdictions. States that have conserved 
lex loci tend to be pro-defendant states.143 Contrary to Hay’s 
 
 138. See supra text accompanying notes 124–26. 
 139. See supra text accompanying note 127. 
 140. Hay, supra note 136, at 629. 
 141. Id. 647–49. 
 142. Note, obviously, that accidents occurring in pro-defendant state B will already be 
subject to state B’s laws under lex loci. 
 143. See Hay, supra note 136, at 649. 
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prediction, plaintiffs fare better in “interest analysis” states, on 
average, than do defendants.144 
Why is this so? Several factors appear to be in play. Professor Hay 
seems to have, in the first place, neglected the fact that the status quo 
ante, lex loci, will survive until that doctrine is overturned by a 
(therefore) activist court. Activism in one field is arguably the result 
of a legal philosophy which may breed activism in other fields. States 
that have declined to abandon lex loci delictus are, under this view, 
also less likely to modify common law substantive product liability 
rules, which were originally more favorable to defendants. In short, 
states whose substantive rules result in less frequent manufacturer 
liability do not adopt “interest analysis” for the same reason they do 
not change their substantive product liability rules. 
Secondly, Professor Hay seems unconcerned with the reasons 
why “interest analysis” was adopted by these activist courts. A good 
illustration of “interest analysis” in action can be found in Duncan v. 
Cessna Aircraft Co.145 In Duncan, the plaintiff’s decedent and 
husband, a resident of Texas, had traveled to New Mexico to 
contract with a flight school and was killed in New Mexico during 
the crash of the Cessna aircraft in which he was taking his flying 
lesson.146 The decedent’s wife then signed a release in return for 
receipt of $90,000 from the flying school.147 The release did not 
name the Cessna Corporation but did state that it precluded liability 
by “any other corporations or persons whomsoever responsible 
therefore, whether named herein or not.”148 Under New Mexico law, 
this release would have benefited Cessna, which presumably could 
therefore charge lower aircraft lease rates to New Mexico flight 
schools.149 
But the plaintiff sued in her home state, Texas. The forum court 
held that Texas law, which did not allow Cessna to avail itself of the 
release, should apply to the accident because of “interest analysis.”150 
 
 144. See Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 995 P.2d 1002, 1015 (Mont. 2000) (deciding to 
adopt interest analysis because it will allow Montana law to apply to the out-of-state accident, 
thereby affording substantial recovery and because “Montana is interested in fully 
compensating Montana residents.”); see also Solimine, supra note 129. 
 145. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984). 
 146. Id. at 418. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 420. 
 150. Id. 
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New Mexico, the Texas court wrote, had little “interest” in seeing its 
law applied, because defendant Cessna was a Kansas corporation and 
New Mexico, locus of neither party, was therefore presumably 
indifferent to the outcome of the litigation.151 On the other hand, 
Texas was acutely “interested” in compensation for injured Texas 
residents.152 
The Texas court conveniently overlooked the fact that New 
Mexico may have a distinct interest in allowing release terms in the 
state to reflect the state’s legal rules. In other words, New Mexico, 
like all states, has an “interest” in autarky. The forum court’s refusal 
to apply New Mexico law to the case prevented New Mexico from 
achieving this result. Unless it can somehow restrict New Mexico 
flying lessons to New Mexico domiciliaries, Cessna no longer has a 
basis for charging lower equipment lease rates to charter firms in 
New Mexico. 
Texas succeeded, through “interest analysis,” in having New 
Mexicans “share the pain” of Texas law. It did this by seeing 
“interest” as a synonym for a distributive preference toward in-state 
plaintiffs, as articulated by Justice Neely in West Virginia. But this 
distributive preference is incompatible with neutral tort adjudication, 
in which the legal system is indifferent as to the victor.153 This notion 
of “interest” exacerbates the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
The tendency to use “interest analysis” to favor locals is 
illustrated in a different way by Rutherford v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co.154 In Rutherford, the plaintiff was injured in her home 
state of Indiana when her car was hit by the vehicle of a fellow 
Indianan. The accident occurred following the explosion on the 
latter car of a tire originally mounted on the spare tire wheel in 
Kentucky at an automobile assembly plant.155 Indiana’s statute of 
repose156 barred the suit, so plaintiff sued in Kentucky, whose statute 
of repose was more favorable. Applying “interest analysis”, the 
 
 151. Id. at 421. 
 152. Id. at 422. 
 153. See generally Krauss, supra note 42. 
 154. 943 F. Supp. 789 (W.D. Ky. 1996). 
 155. Id. at 791. 
 156. A statute of repose quiets any litigation after a given period—here, a given period 
after the assembly of the automobile. Statutes of repose are similar to statutes of limitation, 
except that the latter (but not the former) may be suspended (or “tolled”) by such factors as 
the age of the victim or the defendant’s leaving the jurisdiction. See PROSSER ET AL., supra 
note 122, § 30. 
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Kentucky court, in a result that favored its local resident, the auto 
plant, declined to apply Kentucky law.157 The court stated that 
Kentucky had no “interest” in applying its substantive product 
liability law in a way that would hold Kentucky manufacturers liable 
for injuries to non-residents.158 The Kentucky court therefore chose 
to apply Indiana law, including Indiana’s statute of repose.159 
The reader might protest that Rutherford appears precisely to 
confirm Hay’s hypothesis—the location of the plant in Kentucky led 
the local court to be less pro-plaintiff than it might otherwise have 
been. But in this one case where Professor Hay’s vision might seem 
to be corroborated, the same solution would have resulted from lex 
loci delictus.160 Indeed, plaintiff’s optimal tactic under “interest 
analysis” might have been to sue in Indiana and persuade the Indiana 
court to apply Kentucky law (or at least the Kentucky statute of 
repose). Indiana uses lex loci and not “interest analysis,” however, 
and so would have been precluded from applying Kentucky law. 
Crucially, Indiana would have had to adopt “interest analysis” for 
the plaintiff to succeed under this strategy.161 This is powerful 
substantiation that adopting “interest analysis” tends to benefit local 
plaintiffs, not defendants. 
Finally, Professor Hay neglects the fact that plaintiffs choose the 
forum state, which will therefore typically be the jurisdiction in 
which they believe they have the greatest chance of recovery. The 
forum state is also the state making the choice-of-law decision. 
Plaintiffs will choose a low-liability forum state only if there really is 
no other choice. If plaintiff’s home state and the state where the 
accident occurred are the same low-liability state, odds are that the 
law of that low-liability state will apply regardless of whether it uses 
lex loci or “interest analysis.” Only when plaintiff’s preferred state has 
for some reason barred the suit would “interest analysis” ever favor 
defendants. 
Thus, Professor Hay’s hypothesis fails. Indeed, pro-plaintiff 
jurisdictions have occasionally declined to use the “interest analysis” 
rule to protect resident firms from out-of-state plaintiffs, thereby 
 
 157. Rutherford, 943 F. Supp. at 793. 
 158. Id. at 792. 
 159. Id. at 791–92. 
 160. The injury occurred in Indiana. Id. at 791. 
 161. See Phillips v. General Motors Corp., 995 P.2d 1002 (Mont. 2000), for an instance 
where a state adopts “interest analysis” explicitly for this purpose. 
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demonstrating a commitment to pro-plaintiff ideology162 that is very 
hard to square with Professor Hay’s predicted reasons for adopting 
“interest analysis.” For example, in Gantes v. Kason Corp.,163 an 
accident in Georgia fatally injured a Georgia woman, resulting in a 
wrongful death suit by her Georgia family against the New Jersey 
manufacturer of the machine allegedly responsible for her death. 
Georgia’s statute of repose precluded the suit, so the plaintiff sued in 
New Jersey. The New Jersey court applied its own law to hold the 
manufacturer liable, stating that its concern for injured victims 
(wherever they may live) overrode its fear of discouraging 
manufacturing in the Garden State.164 
The contrast between Rutherford and Gantes gives rise to one 
relevant observation. At the margin, firms have an incentive to locate 
in those “interest analysis” states (like Kentucky165) that clearly 
discriminate against out-of-state residents, rather than in those other 
“interest analysis” states (like New Jersey) that apparently maintain a 
pro-plaintiff predisposition in every respect. This very slight incentive 
can obviously be overwhelmed by other factors, as New Jersey’s and 
Kentucky’s relative industrial bases would tend to indicate. 
B. A Note on Countervailing Tendencies 
To claim that both of the currently prevailing “choice-of-law” 
rules inhibit autarkical solutions to the Prisoner’s Dilemma is not to 
deny the existence of all countervailing tendencies against liability.166 
Such factors include the following: 
 
 
 
 162. See generally George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical 
History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985) 
(explaining that an ideological commitment to a pro-plaintiff product liability regime is the 
best explanation for the change in legal rules). 
 163. 679 A.2d 106, 107 (N.J. 1996). 
 164. Id. at 111–12. 
 165. See Rutherford, 943 F. Supp. 789. Recall, though, that the same result would have 
obtained in Rutherford under lex loci delictus. 
 166. Imagine an extreme state of affairs in which courts tend to hold firms liable without 
requiring any proximate causation. General Motors would, in such a regime, be liable 
whenever anyone dies in a car crash involving a GM car, regardless of the cause of death and of 
the existence of any defect. That such absurd results have not occurred suggests that 
countervailing forces surely provide a check against complete degeneration of product liability 
law. 
3KRA FIN 11/15/2002 7:50 PM 
759] Product Liability and Game Theory 
 795 
• Judges and juries are subject to more than redistributive 
economic appeals. Religious and other normative beliefs 
about individual responsibility, for example, clearly 
influence both legal and factual determinations. Juries in 
many states, for instance, have resisted many attempts to 
extract money from tobacco companies, even though 
plaintiffs were local, because they believed the decision to 
start and continue to smoke was voluntary.167 
• State and federal constitutional protections preclude 
overt takings from out-of-state defendants.168 
• Appointed state judges are arguably not subject to “rent-
seeking” pressures as intense as those affecting elected 
judges.169 
• Out-of-state manufacturers can lobby state legislatures to 
enact pro-defendant tort reform—and political 
contributions from outside the state are permitted in 
every jurisdiction.170 
 
These countervailing forces notwithstanding, it seems clear that 
current choice-of-law rules do not inhibit the Prisoner’s Dilemma of 
product liability. The shift from lex loci delictus to “interest analysis” 
has been a shift from one conflicts rule favoring local plaintiffs to a 
different rule that favors local plaintiffs even more. If the states have 
not been able to resolve these conflicts satisfactorily, federal 
substantive intervention might appear to be a fruitful option. That 
option is explored in the next section. 
IV. AUTARKY THROUGH FEDERAL PREEMPTION 
Prisoner’s Dilemmas are, in the jargon of game theory, 
“coordination problems”—if players could reliably harmonize their 
activity, a Pareto-superior171 solution would be within reach. 
 
 167. KRAUSS, supra note 57, at 27. 
 168. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 571 (1996) (noting that a state’s 
power to impose burdens on interstate commerce is limited both by the Commerce Clause and 
by the need to respect the interests of other states). But see Krauss, supra note 79, at 91–92, 
98. 
 169. Tabarrok & Helland, supra note 27, at 163. 
 170. Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the Proper Federal Role in American Tort Law, 38 
ARIZ. L. REV. 917, 936–37 (1996). 
 171. See supra note 110. 
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Coordination problems can be resolved, generally speaking, in one of 
two ways: either through the centralized imposition of the optimal 
solution from outside the group, or via an alteration of incentives so 
as to induce each player to spontaneously act in the socially 
appropriate way. The search for an autarkical product liability system 
might conceivably involve either form of coordination. 
Federalization of substantive product liability law represents the 
first kind of solution. If decision making takes place at the national 
level, where (by definition) most costs are “internalized,” strategies 
such as Justice Neely’s would be pointless. Nationalization of product 
liability law has been advocated by numerous observers172 and is put 
forward on a regular basis in Congress.173 Furthermore, there is no 
insuperable constitutional obstacle to federal action. Because a 
national market now exists for products, and because product liability 
law helps regulate economic transactions, federal legislation could be 
defended as an exercise of the “interstate commerce” power.174 
This article will not address the constitutional question, because 
its claim is that, even if it were constitutional, federal dislocation of 
states’ product liability jurisdiction is inopportune. Substantive 
federal preemption would entail severe coordination and knowledge 
problems. Nor would a purely “liberal” intervention by federal 
authorities—i.e., the nullification of compulsory state rules, allowing 
free contractual allocation of the risks of product use—be 
appropriate. The next section makes this argument against both 
kinds of federal intervention. Next the question of federally imposed 
choice-of-law rules will be introduced. 
 
 172. See, e.g., O. Lee Reed & John L. Watkins, Product Liability Tort Reform: The Case 
for Federal Action, 63 NEB. L. REV. 389 (1984); Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, A 
Permanent Solution for Product Liability Crises: Uniform Federal Tort Law Standards, 64 
DENV. U. L. REV. 685 (1988). 
 173. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. S12,751-01 (statement of Sen. Kasten on Product 
Liability Reform Act); 142 CONG. REC. H3184-07 (statement of Rep. Bliley on Common 
Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996); see also H.R. 423, 106th Cong. (2000) 
(limiting the product liability of non-manufacturer product sellers); see also, Small Business 
Liability Reform Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 2366 Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 
105th Cong. (1999) (statement by Rep. Henry Hyde). 
 174. Senator Spencer Abraham, Litigation Tariff: The Federal Case for National Tort 
Reform, POL’Y REV., Summer 1995, at http://www.policyreview.org/summer95/thabra. 
html. 
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A. Preemption and Legal Coordination Problems175 
Product liability law only recently emerged as a somewhat 
distinct field from tort law, which is state based.176 Should federal 
statutes occupy this field and preempt state law, courts would be 
obliged to conjugate federal and state law whenever lawsuits raise 
both product liability and tort issues. For example: 
 
• If a manufacturer is liable under new federal product 
rules and, say, an employer is liable to an injured worker 
under a state exception to workers’ compensation 
protection,177 is the liability of these two parties “joint 
and several” or merely “several”?178 
• How should a plaintiff’s federal products suit against the 
manufacturer of an allegedly defective car be harmonized 
with her state tort case against the driver who allegedly 
failed to reasonably control that car?179 
• How would common-law doctrines developed by state 
courts and subject to revision by those courts, coordinate 
with federal statutes, which would presumably be beyond 
the scope of judicial fine-tuning?180 
 
 175. Coordination problems bedevil other areas of federal legislation, of course. This 
article’s contention is not that product liability is unique in this regard, but rather that it is wise 
to avoid creating additional legal coordination problems since other means of achieving autarky 
are available. 
 176. The emergence of product liability law as a distinct discipline is conventionally dated 
to the early 1960s when a series of influential cases (mostly from California) advocated a 
departure from several crucial tort doctrines when products caused injury. See, e.g., Greenman 
v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900–02 (Cal. 1963); see also Reed & Watkins, supra 
note 172, at 390. 
 177. In Ohio, this exception is particularly stubborn; the Ohio Supreme Court recently 
struck down as unconstitutional in its entirety a statute attempting to limit such employer 
liability. See Johnson v. BP Chems., Inc., 707 N.E.2d 1107, 1114 (Ohio 1999). 
 178. Multiple defendants are “jointly and severally” liable when any one of them can be 
called on to pay the entire tort award. Some states, like California, have extended the concept 
of joint and several liability beyond its traditional bounds. See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 
(Cal. 1948); see also Am. Motorcycle Ass’n v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899, 904–05 (Cal. 
1978). New Mexico, on the other hand, has abolished joint and several liability by statute, 
with narrow exceptions. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1 (Michie 2001). 
 179. See William Powers, Jr., Some Pitfalls of Federal Tort Reform Legislation, 38 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 909 (1996); Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 172, at 944. 
 180. See United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 332 U.S. 301, 313 (1947) (holding 
that federal courts may not create new common law). 
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• How would this federal legislation mesh with state tort 
reform? Would it shift the locus of lobbying efforts to 
Congress, thereby altering both federal and state political 
processes?181 
• Would federal “codification” of product liability law 
inevitably lead to a preemption of all state tort law? If a 
federal takeover of all of tort law were inevitable and 
feasible, would this not lead to an invasion of contract 
law as well?182 Would the disappearance of the states as 
the principal locus of private ordering be in our 
interests?183 
B. Preemption and Knowledge Problems 
Federal preemption of substantive product liability laws spawns 
at least three major knowledge problems. 
First, beyond the difficulties of coordination and the risk of 
federal intrusion on state responsibility for private ordering, 
uncertainty about the content of “perfect” product liability 
legislation argues strongly against preemption by Congress. Endless 
and intricate calculations of utility functions, risk preferences, and 
philosophical outlooks184 of individuals would be needed to 
 
 181. One explanation for Congress’s constant revisiting of the product liability reform 
issue is that keeping the issue potentially “on the table” makes it easier for members of both 
federal political parties to engage in fundraising from their respective “allies.” See Jill 
Abramson, Product-Liability Bill Provides Opportunity for Long-Term Milking of PACs by 
Congress, WALL ST. J., June 21, 1990, at A16. 
 182. See generally Schwartz, supra note 170, at 945. Much of tort law consists of the 
determination of the boundary between tort and contract. See also Krauss, supra note 42, at 
627–28. 
 183. Krauss, supra note 79, at 98 (wondering whether jury bias against out-of-state 
corporations may be analogized to a state tax on those firms, in violation of the Commerce 
Clause of the Constitution; countering that federal preemption of state private law may have 
dire consequences). 
 184. Such outlooks are directly related to opinions about black letter issues in product 
liability. For instance, virtually all observers agree that “causation” should be required for 
manufacturers to be liable. But what “causes” a product to injure a consumer? Is it consumer 
misuse, insufficient “idiot-proofing” of safety devices, third-party negligence, or manufacturer 
cost cutting? As practitioners know, many (perhaps most) accidents involving products involve 
a combination of these factors. Deciding which constitutes the legal cause of an injury is, in no 
small part, a philosophical issue. If one believes that individuals are primarily responsible for 
their own fate, conscious misuse of a product by an injured consumer may be a decisive 
argument against product liability. If one sees consumers as lacking fully free will, acting largely 
as unthinking pawns in a game played by powerful commercial interests, corporate cost cutting 
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determine the correct allocation of the risks of products among 
manufacturers and consumers. There is no particular reason to 
believe in a “one-size-fits-all” solution across the nation. It is 
apparent that moral views and risk preferences vary across individuals 
and regions. As Michael Greve has written, albeit in a somewhat 
different context, “topography and climate aside, no one would 
mistake Texas for New York, or Nebraska for Massachusetts.”185 
Diversity creates a knowledge problem and lessens the chance that 
we can find one “correct” product liability rule. 
Lack of competition is a second knowledge problem afflicting 
federal product liability legislation. State legislation, if properly 
arranged so that costs and benefits are autarkical, is conducive to a 
competition that will produce the information needed to determine 
and reflect diverse preferences. If a state’s product liability rules are 
too generous to plaintiffs, or to manufacturers for that matter, and if 
the costs of these rules are essentially reflected within that state, their 
impact will eventually lead to a demand for change. The cost of a 
product might rise tremendously, for example, if prices in one 
jurisdiction had to incorporate a high premium to cover accidents 
that would be easily avoidable if only the consumer used reasonable 
care.186 Consumers in that state might, if given a choice, prefer 
product liability rules in competing jurisdictions that call for a degree 
of “assumption of risk” they find more acceptable. Competition for 
good laws among states can serve the same purpose as competition 
among products.187 
 
in shaping design and manufacturing processes may be determinate. 
 185. Michael S. Greve, Federalism After the Election, AEI FEDERALIST OUTLOOK NO. 4, 
at 2 (Dec. 2000), available at http://www.aei.org/fo/fo12346.htm. 
 186. Thus, in O’Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983), the New Jersey 
Supreme Court implied that all above-ground pools were socially inappropriate products. The 
court hinted that the manufacturers of such pools should therefore insure users against all 
hazards, including injuries to felonious trespassers. Suppose that O’Brien had not been 
legislatively overruled. If price differentiation were feasible because of autarky, such pools 
would cost much more in New Jersey than elsewhere. This would create powerful lobbies to 
modify the New Jersey rule, unless, of course, Garden State residents are truly averse to the 
risks of above-ground pools, and indifferent to summer swimming, as the New Jersey Supreme 
Court apparently supposed. 
 187. See, e.g., Robert Bish, Federalism: A Market Economics Perspective, in PUBLIC 
CHOICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 351–68 (James Gwarney & Richard Wagner 
eds., 1988); LUDWIG VON MISES, SOCIALISM: AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
(J. Kahane trans., 1951); Jeremy Shearmur, From Dialogue Rights to Property Rights: 
Foundations for Hayek’s Legal Theory, CRITICAL REV., WINTER–SPRING 1990, at 106–32. 
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By contrast, substantive federal legislation imposes one product 
on all, all at once. It does not allow for learning over time, a third 
knowledge problem. As one commentator noted, “The choice 
between state authority and federal authority is the choice between 
competition and monopoly.”188 A federal private law rule forced on 
the country had better be “the right” one (and there had better be 
one “right” solution for our diverse population), for it is much more 
expensive to opt out of a country’s laws than it is to use “voice” and 
“exit” when dissatisfied with one’s state.189 As the federal legislature 
experiences less legal competition than do the states, it learns over 
time much more slowly. 
C. Federal Imposition of Freedom of Contract 
Under a more or less libertarian view, any compulsory 
assignment of product liability risks, by any level of government, is 
undesirable. After all, products are sold, not found on the beach by 
strangers. Sales are contracts, presumably freely negotiated. The 
majority of product liability litigants are separated by one or two 
degrees of contractual behavior. According to this view, federal law 
should merely prohibit all binding product liability regulations. 
States could propose “default” rules, of course; these default rules 
might diminish transaction costs if they are popular. But in any event 
parties would be free to contractually opt out-of-state default rules 
and to agree upon their own allocation of risks.190 
The doctrine of freedom of contract is appealing as a general 
matter,191 but federally implemented libertarianism would be highly 
problematic for at least four reasons: 
 
• As was averred earlier,192 any federal preemption, 
including forced “liberation” from state product liability 
rules, implicitly signifies that there is no collectively felt 
need to establish local safety standards that manufacturers 
 
 188. Harvey S. Perlman, Products Liability Reform in Congress: An Issue of Federalism, 48 
OHIO ST. L.J. 503, 507 (1987). 
 189. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Revitalizing Consent, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 753, 795–
98 (2000). 
 190. PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
195 (1988); RUBIN, supra note 8, at 24. 
 191. THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT at 1–2 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999). 
 192. See supra text accompanying note 181. 
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may not waive. But this cannot be known. It is difficult 
to appreciate ex cathedra in Washington that shifting risks 
to manufacturers, or to consumers, would produce a true 
collective good. Indeed, the libertarian view assumes 
away any real collective good. But states are much more 
likely to be sensitive to the existence of (and desirous of 
implementing) local collective goods than is the federal 
government.193 
• Mandatory freedom of contract would contradict 
longstanding notions of public policy in all fifty states.194 
For example, under a purely contractual regime, General 
Motors might market automobiles with the following 
legally binding195 statement: 
Warning: We have determined that, under current 
production and quality control procedures, one in 
every 500,000 vehicles we make will fail 
catastrophically during its first year of use, without 
any fault by the driver. The parties hereby agree 
that General Motors will not be liable for injuries 
proximately caused by such failures. 
 Although there is no reason to believe GM would find it 
advantageous to issue such a disclaimer,196 there is also 
no reason to believe that any legislature (at the federal or 
state levels), state supreme court, or jury would enforce a 
“warning—we might have botched it” sticker if any firm 
ever did print one. In addition to the common law of 
 
 193. The thrust of this contention, in a nutshell, is that autarky is preferable to 
“anarchy.” Local collectivities should be able to set a standard of liability that one might 
vehemently oppose (e.g., “GM is liable for every person injured in any accident in a GM 
vehicle,” or “GM is never liable for any costs of accidents,” or something in between), as long 
as the costs of that rule are, for all intents and purposes, internalized inside the collectivity. 
 194. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69, 84–102 (N.J. 1960) 
(holding that manufacturers are not free to waive liability for manufacturing defects). 
Henningsen has essentially been adopted in every state, through Restatement (Second) Torts 
§ 402A. Even states declining to adopt a form of § 402A have in practice endorsed 
Henningsen. See, e.g., Matthews v. Ford Motor Corp., 479 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1973) (applying 
Virginia law, and holding that contractual limitation of the right to recover consequential 
damages for product liability is prima facie unconscionable). 
 195. The waiver would presumably be binding on purchasers, who would be bound to 
secure the consent of their passengers. 
 196. Brand capital would almost certainly be affected by an unwillingness to stand behind 
defective products. See also infra text accompanying notes 198–99. 
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product liability in all states, widespread adoption of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (which, for example, states 
that disclaimers impliedly contradicting express 
warranties are unenforceable197) is tough to reconcile 
with contractual laissez-faire. 
• In any case, it is difficult to imagine that manufacturers 
would attempt to renounce liability for defective 
products, because manufacturers are much more efficient 
bearers of certain subsets of unilateral risk than are 
consumers.198 A “warning—we might have botched it” 
sticker would under this rationale be the result of limited 
consumer rationality199 and of intrinsic asymmetries in 
information. 
• Finally non-contracting parties (e.g., pedestrians hit by 
automobiles) will always constitute some percentage of 
victims of defectively manufactured products. Some non-
contractual product liability rule will always be needed 
for this reason alone. 
 
If neither uniform federal product liability legislation nor federal 
abrogation of all state product liability rules is appropriate, there 
remains an important federal role in helping resolve the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma. This role can be achieved through federal choice-of-law 
legislation. 
V. AUTARKY THROUGH FEDERAL CHOICE-OF-LAW LEGISLATION 
This article contends that uniform, federally imposed product 
liability choice-of-law rules would be both legitimate and 
constructive. Choice-of-law rules could resolve the Prisoner’s  
 
 
 197. U.C.C. § 2-316 (1977). 
 198. Stephen P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for 
Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683, 766–67 (1993). Hidden manufacturing defects 
come to mind. 
 199. There are several articles on systematic irrational behavior. The most famous cases 
are presented in M. ALLAIS, Fondements d’une théorie positive des choix comportant un risque et 
critique des postulats et axiomes de l’école Américaine, in COLLOQUES INTERNATIONAUX DU 
CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE 40, 257–332 (1953); Amos Tversky & 
Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 
(1974). 
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Dilemma by moving state law toward autarky, without shutting 
down the states’ laboratories of private ordering. 
It might be argued that, if federal imposition of substantive rules 
of product liability is inappropriate, imposition of federal choice-of-
law rules is equally illegitimate. Such was the position of the 
Supreme Court in Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.200 
Klaxon held that federal courts must not develop or follow any 
national choice-of-law rule in their application of the Erie 
doctrine.201 But Klaxon has been witheringly criticized. Virtually no 
one claims the decision is required by the Constitution. Professors 
Hart and Wechsler maintained, to the contrary, that Klaxon in fact 
subverted the constitutional principle of Erie.202 Erie, they argue, was 
meant to assure predictability of the law in each state, i.e., the law 
would be the same for transactions occurring in a state, regardless of 
the type of court hearing a suit.203 But Klaxon undermined 
predictability by increasing uncertainty about the applicable law, 
depending on the location in which a lawsuit was filed.204 As 
Professor Hart pointed out separately, federal courts freed from 
parochial interests are in an ideal position to resolve conflicts 
between states, but neutral resolution is possible only if federal 
courts implement stable, common choice-of-law rules.205 
Unfortunately, case law implementing Klaxon has allowed for 
truly arbitrary selection of state law by individual plaintiffs in 
products cases, in clear violation of the spirit of Erie. Thus, in Ferens 
v. John Deere & Co.,206 a Pennsylvania plaintiff was injured in 
Pennsylvania while using farm machinery purchased in Pennsylvania 
and manufactured by Deere in Illinois.207 Plaintiff had missed 
Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations and so sued in federal 
court in Mississippi, which has a six-year statute of limitation, 
obtaining personal jurisdiction on the grounds that Deere markets its 
 
 200. 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
 201. Id. at 496–97. 
 202. See RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 688 (4th ed. 1996). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. 
REV. 489, 515 (1954). 
 206. 494 U.S. 516 (1990). 
 207. Id. at 519 
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products in that state. The case was quickly transferred to 
Pennsylvania on forum non conveniens grounds, under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1404(a). But the Supreme Court held that since no federal 
conflicts rule had been adopted (as per Klaxon), Mississippi’s 
conflicts rule (which required the applications of Mississippi’s long 
limitation period) must be applied since suit was originally filed 
there. The Court in effect allowed and encouraged plaintiffs to stop 
over in one state and pick up favorable rules on their way to the 
obvious eventual forum.208 Cases like these, made possible by the 
lack of a federal choice-of-law rule, have made a shambles of the 
laboratory of federalism. It is time to contemplate a change. 
In the next section, the legitimacy of a federal conflicts rule will 
be briefly sketched. The focus of the article then shifts to the 
determination of the optimal content of such a rule, and to the 
implications of its implementation for product liability law and for 
related legal doctrines. 
A. A Federal Choice-of-Law Rule Is Legitimate 
The constitutional scheme for allocating product liability 
authority among the states, given current national marketing 
arrangements, requires federal choice-of-law rules. Choice-of-law 
authority cannot reside in the states, tempted as each one is by 
choice-of-law rules that favor its own citizens over out-of-staters. 
Authority to make choice-of-law rules compatible with the Privileges 
and Immunities and the Full Faith and Credit Clauses of the 
Constitution resides in the Congress209 or, failing Congressional 
action, in the interpretive power of the Supreme Court.210 Indeed, 
one author has gone so far as to maintain that the dearth of federal  
 
 
 208. See, e.g., Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 517 (1990). 
 209. The Full Faith and Credit Clause includes the following: “Congress may by general 
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and 
the Effect thereof.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Congress may, it is generally agreed, thus specify 
which state’s law gets full effect in different classes of cases. See Walter Wheeler Cook, The 
Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28 YALE L.J. 421, 425–26 (1919); 
Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional 
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 331 (1992). 
 210. For example, the Court might declare unconstitutional state choice-of-law rules that 
have the purpose or the effect of subverting the principles of legitimacy sketched above. The 
Court might also, more problematically perhaps, impose its own choice-of-law rule, if it found 
that only one such rule was legitimate under the Constitution. 
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choice-of-law rules arguably constitutes an abdication of a federal 
constitutional duty.211 
As has been pointed out by Douglas Laycock,212 three 
fundamental principles both justify and circumscribe the exercise of 
legitimate federal authority over choice of law: 
 
• The principle of equal American citizens.213 Each state 
must, as a general matter, treat citizens of sister states on 
an equal basis with its own citizens.214 This implies that 
states may not adopt or exploit choice-of-law rules in 
order to favor local citizens over citizens of sister states. 
Yet, in practice if not in theory,215 lex loci and (especially) 
“interest analysis” rules, at the state level, have each 
contributed to violations of this principle.216 
• The principle that states are territorial.217 The allocation 
of sovereignty among states is territorial. This 
fundamental principle is essentially assumed by the 
Constitution.218 State constitutions and acts of admission 
 
 211. Laycock, supra note 209, at 331. I need not, here, adopt Laycock’s view. If choice-
of-law rules are mandated by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, they are 
presumably required in contract law as much as in tort law or product liability. It is enough, for 
my purposes, that it is constitutionally permissible to have a federal choice-of-law rule, under 
the Commerce Clause. 
 212. Id. at 250–51. 
 213. Id. 
 214. This is one of the corollaries of Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities and Full Faith 
and Credit Clauses. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, § 2, cl. 1. 
 215. Lex loci delictus and interest analysis provide incentives to adopt substantive product 
liability rules that disregard the interests of out-of-state individuals and corporations, in order 
to favor state residents. But these rules are facially non-discriminatory. 
Thus, lex loci applies the law of the place of the accident, regardless of who the parties to 
the accident are. If a state declined to decide a case involving an accident inside its borders, 
involving two non-citizens, then the differential treatment of the non-resident would result 
from rules of personal jurisdiction, not from the choice-of-law rule. 
Interest analysis seems more prone to direct discrimination against out-of-state parties in 
large part because it is so much more malleable. However, the ultimate discrimination against 
outsiders is due to the substantive product liability rules resulting from the (often selective) 
application of the “interest analysis.” 
 216. See supra text accompanying notes 135, 143, 216. 
 217. Laycock, supra note 209, at 251. 
 218. Consider for example the Constitution’s restrictions on new states: “No new State 
shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed 
by the Junction of two or more states, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the  
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to the Union do make the territorial basis for state 
sovereignty explicit.219 The implication of the 
territoriality principle is that a state’s claim to regulate 
behavior or to govern a dispute must be based on issues 
related to its territory. A state’s “interest” in extending 
the territorial reach of its own law to the entire country, 
for the purpose of subsidizing its citizens by consumers 
throughout the nation, is not sufficient to legitimize a 
state rule under this principle. Federal choice-of-law rules 
must take the territorial principle into account, refusing 
to select laws on grounds unrelated to the basis of state 
sovereignty. 
• The principle of republicanism.220 Choice-of-law rules 
should, ideally, encourage (or, at the very least, not 
discourage) civic participation in determination of policy. 
Most autarkical situations are compatible with 
republicanism—by confining the major effects of a state’s 
rules to its boundaries, autarky strongly encourages 
citizens to modify rules they find unsuitable and to 
defend those of which they approve. Republicanism also 
implies relatively convenient access to knowledge of laws 
and to lawmakers. If the costs of a New York law are 
borne by all Virginians (who have easy access to it, nor 
political standing to modify it), the republican principle 
would not be satisfied. 
 
These three principles suggest, first and foremost, that “interest 
analysis” is inappropriate as a choice-of-law rule for product liability. 
 
Legislatures of the States Concerned as well as of the Congress.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, 
cl. 1. 
The word “jurisdiction” is clearly a synonym for territory. See Laycock, supra note 209, 
at 317. A state’s authority to govern—its “jurisdiction”—is a place within which no new state 
can be formed. Id. When the Constitution states that no new state shall be formed “within the 
jurisdiction” of another, it does not mean “within the reach of the interests of another,” for 
then every state’s creation would be in breach of this rule. Id. It can only mean “within the 
territory” of another. 
 219. The territorial definitions of states are specified in their organic acts. Id. at 317; see, 
e.g., id. at 318. As the Supreme Court held early on, “Title, jurisdiction, sovereignty, are 
therefore dependent questions, necessarily settled when boundary is ascertained . . . .” Rhode 
Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 733 (1838). 
 220. Laycock, supra note 209, at 288–89. 
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“Interest analysis” does not measure up under the territorial 
principle. After all, “interest analysis” was essentially developed to 
extend the reach of state law to embrace events that occurred in a 
different state. “Interest analysis” certainly does not resolve the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, of course; territoriality presents a second reason 
not to select it. 
Lex loci delictus does respect the territorial principle: the fact that 
an accident happened inside the territory of a given state is a 
constitutionally sound reason to use that state’s rules to determine 
legal obligations arising from the accident. But as practiced, lex loci 
has contributed to the Prisoner’s Dilemma under which states are 
tempted to exploit residents of sister states. This exploitation violates 
the first principle of legitimate state action, the principle of equal 
citizenship. Lex loci could therefore also not be legitimately imposed 
by Congress as a choice-of-law rule for product liability. 
Federal action to impose product liability choice of law is 
legitimate, appropriate, and arguably even required.221 But neither of 
the currently prevalent rules is suitable. Which choice-of-law rules, 
then, reconcile sound principles of federalism with the need to 
resolve the product liability Prisoner’s Dilemma? There are several 
plausible contenders. The federal government might, for example, 
allow manufacturers discretion over the choice of the state whose law 
is applicable to each product it sells. Or, Congress might establish 
the “law of place of manufacture,” or of the “intended place of 
consumption” as mandatory choice-of-law rules. Each of these 
contenders for national choice of law has distinct advantages. Each 
also has drawbacks which preclude its use. In the end, a “state of first 
retail sale” choice-of-law rule best reconciles our constitutional 
structure to our national markets. 
B. Which Federal Choice-of-Law Rule Is Legitimate and Effective? 
1. “Manufacturer’s choice” 
One effort to resolve the Prisoner’s Dilemma through choice of 
law was proposed by Dean Harvey Perlman. It was clearly inspired by 
the competition for incorporation of business associations. It consists 
of a federal rule that would allow manufacturers to state which 
 
 221. Perlman, supra note 188, at 509 
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among the various states’ product liability régimes will apply to their 
products.222 
Companies at present choose among incorporation statutes by 
selecting a state of incorporation. They are free to choose any state, 
even if this state is one in which neither its facilities nor its head 
office is based. States, it is said, compete to have the most efficient 
incorporation statutes.223 Delaware, the current frontrunner in this 
contest, derives both registration fees and other “royalties” (court 
costs, lawyers’ salaries) from its success.224 
Dean Perlman is eager to export this régime to product liability. 
Under his proposal, a manufacturer incorporated in Georgia, for 
example, and producing in Florida a product sold at retail to Mrs. 
Smith in South Carolina could designate Virginia law for all disputes 
arising from the use of the product by Mrs. Smith.225 Under the 
Perlman proposal, Virginia need have no territorial connection with 
the product, the accident, or the victim.226 If the firm’s choice of law 
were adequately published (perhaps through some marking on the 
product’s packaging), Virginia product liability law would apply. 
Products would presumably be priced to reflect expected liability. 
Consumers dissatisfied with the manufacturer’s choice of “liability 
state” could decline to purchase the product at the price offered—if 
the dissatisfaction were severe enough, the price might drop or the 
“liability state” might change (or both). 
Under Perlman’s proposal, a manufacturer could conceivably 
offer an array of “liability packages.” Acme Corporation could sell, 
and consumers could purchase, Acme widgets with a choice of 
Alabama-to-Wyoming liability rules. Purchasers would select widgets 
priced to reflect their desired liability protection under the chosen 
state’s laws, much as car buyers can decide on different kinds of 
warranties when purchasing vehicles. Consumers would presumably 
consider product liability regimes bundled with the product when 
deciding whether the “price is right.” A poor choice of law by the 
manufacturer would lead to financial losses—“too much” liability 
sold “too cheaply” might bankrupt the firm, while “too little” 
 
 222. Id. 
 223. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 1–13 (1993). 
 224. See Perlman, supra note 188; see also Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From 
Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, nn. 28, 37, 355. (2000). 
 225. Perlman, supra note 188, at 507–09. 
 226. Id. 
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liability might be reflected by a drop in sales, as consumers are drawn 
to products from competitors offering more “generous” product 
liability packages. Multiple choices (Pontiacs sold with New Jersey or 
Virginia “liability package” options, etc.) are certainly possible. In 
practice, however, adverse selection problems are such that each 
manufacturer might select a single state’s law to apply to its 
products, thereby also saving legal costs by specializing in the cases 
and legislation of one state.227 
Dean Perlman’s proposal has the advantage of allowing 
consumers in every state to freely select and to internalize the cost of 
their liability rules. If they wish to own a product manufactured by 
company X, consumers might have to buy, bundled with it, state Y’s 
legal rules; if they want another state’s rules they may have to select a 
product made by X’s competitor. Perlman’s proposal would, in 
essence, allow manufacturers to ensure that all their products sold 
nationwide are governed by the same liability rules. As long as those 
rules remain relatively stable,228 a manufacturer would be able to 
price products with confidence that buyers are purchasing a 
voluntarily selected package of risks. This does achieve a measure of 
autarky, though at an individual rather than a state level. 
Notwithstanding this attribute, the Perlman proposal does not 
comply with other legitimacy requirements of federal choice of 
law.229 Perlman’s proposal treats the several states’ citizens equally 
but makes a mockery of the territorial basis of state sovereignty. No 
tie to territory is needed to select a given state’s product liability 
law.230 Neither the consumer nor the producer has any necessary 
territorial link to the state whose law is applied. The consumer never 
impliedly submits to that state’s sovereignty by, say, traveling to it or 
by using the product in it. Only a clause buried in a sales contract, 
which may have been completed in a state other than the governing 
law state, links the plaintiff to that state. 
 
 227. Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signaling, 23(3) RAND J. ECON. 432, 
433 (1992). 
 228. Manufacturers would presumably avoid choosing the product liability law of a state 
whose law is relatively unstable and arbitrary, because of the risk premium that would have to 
be bundled into its price. To the extent that states derive “rents” from having their legal rules 
selected, Dean Perlman’s proposal provides an additional incentive for stability of legal rules. 
 229. See supra text accompanying notes 221–27. 
 230. This makes the Perlman solution even less legitimate than the current competitive 
system regarding incorporation. Incorporation is a self-referential act—i.e., by incorporating in 
a state, a company acquires ipso facto a tie to that state—the tie of “birth.” 
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In addition, Perlman’s rule falls short as concerns the republican 
principle. A consumer is unlikely to be either conversant with or 
active in affecting the chosen state’s liability rules, as might be the 
case if the consumer voted or deliberately shopped in the state in 
question. And under Dean Perlman’s proposal no state could impose 
any product liability rule for any product sold within its jurisdiction. 
Perlman’s choice-of-law proposal in fact bears a close resemblance to 
federal imposition of contractual laissez-faire, discussed above.231 It is 
therefore subject to the weaknesses of the laissez-faire proposal. 
Thus, asymmetrical knowledge about the content of liability rules 
would likely be more pronounced than is presently the case. Say a 
Marylander buys a product in Virginia, and suppose that Hawaii law 
is chosen by the manufacturer to govern product liability issues, 
following the Perlman proposal. It is relatively easy to anticipate that 
a Marylander might know something about her own state’s laws (she 
is or can relatively easily become a participant in Maryland’s political 
process), or even about the laws of Virginia, which she has after all 
purposely visited to go shopping. But she might be totally ignorant 
of Hawaii’s legal structure. Indeed, one result of this asymmetry is 
that a manufacturer might become a much more influential political 
player on the Hawaii product liability scene than it would normally 
be. The manufacturer would almost surely be a more active player 
than would be consumers living out of state and might well be more 
interested in the evolution of Hawaii law than would citizens of that 
state. After all, the latter have no interest in Hawaii product liability 
law per se—they care about the law chosen by the manufacturers of 
the products they purchase! This turns the republican principle on its 
head. Manufacturers would in significant ways be the real 
“citizens”—they could quite naturally be expected to become more 
heavily involved in that state’s political process than physical persons. 
Hence, firms might choose the product liability law of a state with 
more pro-defendant rules than would be demanded by consumers, 
especially if they believe that consumers are unable to accurately 
perceive and measure state liability rules when making purchasing 
decisions because of political estrangement or lack of geographic 
 
 231. See supra Part IV.C. There is only one significant difference between the Perlman 
plan and the laissez-faire proposal: under Perlman’s proposal, manufacturers could not invent 
liability rules from whole cloth but would be limited to those in effect in an American 
jurisdiction. This constraint is so minor as to make Perlman’s plan very close indeed to laissez-
faire. 
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proximity. This could provoke a “race to the bottom,” instead of an 
efficient competition among rules, as is the case for incorporation 
laws.232 
Put another way, the reason why Delaware-dominated “freedom 
to charter” works well is that a small number of very powerful, fully 
informed marginal shareholders, typically institutional investors, are 
present, and their presence deters races to the bottom in 
incorporation choices. There is little reason to believe that consumer 
markets, unlike investment markets, exhibit characteristics of full 
information by powerful players. Shareholders choosing a state of 
incorporation have an incentive to choose the state offering the most 
efficient rules for corporate governance (including rules that help to 
mitigate agency costs prevalent within corporations). Corporate 
managers will not have similar incentives to choose states with 
efficient product liability laws. Of course, if consumers knew 
perfectly what the liability rules for each product implicitly cost, rules 
that are too generous to manufacturers would be penalized by 
consumers and would require lower sale prices, thereby 
counteracting manufacturer incentives to race to the bottom. But 
this thermostatic effect would require an unrealistically high level of 
consumer knowledge of information technology, of firm production 
processes and internal decisions, and of underlying risks.233 Unlike 
institutional investors, consumers have too little stake in any 
individual product to make significant informational investments. 
It is therefore questionable whether states would have any 
incentive to “get it right” when enacting their product liability rules 
under these conditions. States would essentially be “selling” product 
liability rules to manufacturers. Would they receive a percentage of 
each sale as an incentive to enact a popular rule? Would political 
agency costs prevail? Would states derive any other kind of 
“seignorage”234 from the development of widely used rules, 
analogous to Delaware’s incorporation fees?235 
 
 232. See Schwartz, supra note 170, at 938. 
 233. See ROMANO, supra note 223, at 82. 
 234. The profits accruing to the government providing an economic public good (such as 
a currency, or a set of incorporation statutes) are commonly known as seignorage. See generally 
Stanley Fischer, Seignorage and the Case for the National Money, J. POL. ECON., April 1982, at 
295. 
 235. See Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 81, at 144, 180 (claiming that the 
incorporation state’s attorneys will tend to dominate litigation, receiving a form of seignorage, 
and would therefore be proxies advocating the adoption of efficient rules). With the advent of 
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Finally, and quite apart from these questions, the Perlman 
solution is politically problematic. The greater the information 
asymmetry between manufacturer and consumer that a choice-of-law 
rule produces, the less likely it seems that Congress would adopt any 
such rule or that courts would enforce the resulting contractual 
allocation of risk. 
2. Law of head office or of most significant employment 
William Niskanen proposed in 1996 a choice-of-law rule under 
which liability for a manufacturer’s products would be governed by 
the product liability law of the state in which that manufacturer had 
the largest number of employees.236 
Niskanen’s plan appears to come even closer than does Dean 
Perlman’s to the “choice of incorporation” system of corporate law. 
Corporations would presumably choose to locate manufacturing 
facilities in jurisdictions whose product liability rules were most 
attractive to them. This proposal, unlike Perlman’s but akin to 
current incorporation practice, would likely provide significant 
“seignorage” to states that adopt attractive liability rules. “Getting it 
right” would arguably result in a substantial increase in 
manufacturing activity, an attractive proposition lacking in the 
Perlman proposal. Niskanen’s plan in point of fact turns on its head 
the perverse incentives currently imparted by lex loci rules, which (as 
we have seen) leave a corporation fully indifferent between locating 
in high-liability or low-liability locations.237 Finally, and contrary to 
Perlman’s proposal, the Niskanen plan ties liability to territoriality 
and to a state’s political process. After all, manufacturers would have 
to be “residents” (if not “citizens”238) of the state whose law is 
chosen. Those corporate residents, as well as their employees and 
those who depend on them, would have a political stake in, and a 
strong incentive to understand, local product liability laws. 
 
interstate practice of law, however, it is not obvious that states would be able to procure 
significant royalties from enacting favored product liability legislation. Court fees rarely if ever 
absorb the full social costs of dispute resolution, and bar admission fees do not appear to be a 
significant revenue item. Id. at 180. 
 236. William A. Niskanen, Do Not Federalize Tort Law: A Friendly Response to Senator 
Abraham, 1 MICH. L. & POL’Y REV. 105, 109–10 (1996). 
 237. See supra text accompanying note 128. 
 238. If the state of incorporation is chosen instead of the state of manufacturing activity, 
then citizenship, not mere residency, would be required. 
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As with the Perlman proposal, though, and unlike lex loci 
delictus, Niskanen’s plan requires no consumer act of republican 
“submission” to the state’s territory. In no sense does a purchaser 
actively “choose” any legal rule. In no sense does she have a willful 
territorial link to the state writing the rule. As noted above, this de-
emphasis on citizens’ informed choices also makes the Niskanen 
proposal unlikely to be adopted by Congress or enforced by courts. 
In addition, the Niskanen plan may have “public choice” 
problems. Whereas Perlman allows both defendant and plaintiff to be 
“strangers” to the state whose law is being applied, the Niskanen 
arrangement makes it likely that the manufacturer of a product is 
much closer to the locus of the determination of relevant liability 
rules than are purchasers. This has intrinsic political implications. An 
auto manufacturer in Michigan, for example, would likely be very 
persuasive if it argued that that state should adopt more pro-
defendant product liability rules.239 As Niskanen would apply 
Michigan rules to sales by that manufacturer throughout the 
country, the plan would in effect violate the neutrality principle, the 
first principle of legitimacy sketched out above:240 it would prefer in-
state to out-of state interests. Here, though, the in-state interests 
would be those of manufacturers, not consumers.241 
The Niskanen proposal predicts that manufacturing states will 
not be tempted by a “race to the bottom”—presumably because 
consumers would at the margin decline to purchase goods produced 
in inefficiently pro-defendant states, preferring ceteris paribus those 
made in more plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions. This noble hope 
assumes a consumer information level that is hard to reconcile with 
the Niskanen proposal’s republican failings. A populace not involved 
in the elaboration of a law is for that reason less likely to be familiar 
with it. In this sense, Niskanen’s plan shares a weakness of Perlman’s. 
It should be noted that competition is unlikely to remedy these 
problems in a systematic way, because of the collection of small 
frictions that are so often barriers to free entry. For instance, 
pharmaceutical companies may have patent monopolies on certain 
 
 239. See Schwartz, supra note 172, at 938. 
 240. See supra text accompanying notes 213–16. 
 241. Indeed, under Niskanen’s proposal one could imagine a strategy similar to that of 
Justice Neely: a state supreme court might always choose the liability rule or interpretation 
which favored the defendant, reasoning that losses to in-state consumers are more than 
outweighed by gains to in-state workers. 
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medications. Under the Niskanen plan, such companies might have a 
distinct interest in choosing a pro-defendant state for their 
manufacturing. Even if that state’s rules were inefficiently pro-
defendant, the patent monopoly would preclude competitors from 
manufacturing the same product in a different state. 
3. Law of intended place of consumption 
Professor John Kozyris has proposed a product liability choice-
of-law rule opting for the law of the “intended place of use” of a 
product.242 The best thing about this plan is that it is territorially and 
politically legitimate. The vast majority of people injured by products 
are consumers or persons in privity with consumers—by definition 
these people have a territorial connection to the jurisdiction whose 
law is applied. Kozyris’s plan thus tends to apply legal rules that are 
in a meaningful way chosen by the plaintiff. By opting to use the 
product in a given jurisdiction, a plaintiff has in essence assented to 
that jurisdiction’s exercise of sovereignty over the accident. It will be 
frequently, though not always, the case that the plaintiff is a citizen 
of that state; in that capacity, he will also have opportunity to take 
cognizance of, and political action affecting, the jurisdiction’s legal 
rules. 
Kozyris’s plan (unlike Perlman’s and Niskanen’s) would not 
likely result in uniform pricing for all the products of any given 
manufacturer. A firm’s products would be subject to different 
liability regimes in each jurisdiction. Again, this is not a predicament. 
A natural consequence of federalism is that companies know they are 
subject to different rules in different jurisdictions. Differential pricing 
of a company’s products in different states is not intrinsically 
incompatible with autarky. 
Unfortunately, the fatal defect of Kozyris’s proposal is that it 
does nothing to resolve the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Since two products 
sold at the same location might be intended for use in two different 
states, a vendor could not charge different prices (to reflect different 
ex ante liability outcomes) without conducting a rather expensive 
inquiry into the purchaser’s intent.243 Higher up the chain of 
 
 242. P. John Kozyris, Choice of Law For Products Liability: Whither Ohio?, 48 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 377, 383–85 (1987). Note that Kozyris was proposing that states adopt this rule. 
However, there is no reason not to analyze his proposal as a potential federal solution. 
 243. The investigation would not be expensive for certain products, e.g., automobiles, 
3KRA FIN 11/15/2002 7:50 PM 
759] Product Liability and Game Theory 
 815 
distribution, at the manufacturer’s level, it will be even more difficult 
to discriminate when pricing units of production. Differential pricing 
of products to reflect liability rules is therefore unlikely. Accordingly, 
a retailer in a given state is likely to charge all purchasers the same 
price, though different legal rules will apply to different purchasers. 
Because of this, purchasers in high-liability states are at the margin 
more likely to cross state lines to purchase a product, only to claim 
the benefit of their home state’s law if an injury relating to the 
product arises. This arbitrage will inhibit differential pricing just as 
under lex loci—a manufacturer will understand that expected liability 
from sales in a state is not a function of that state’s liability rules. A 
pro-plaintiff state’s law will be applied at the expense of the low-
liability state, as currently occurs. This violation of the equality 
principle encourages strategic behavior similar to that practiced by 
Justice Neely.244 
C. Law of Place of First Retail Sale 
1. Attributes of the rule 
This effort to reconcile constitutional mandates with the need to 
solve the Prisoner’s Dilemma would apply to each product the 
liability rule of the state of that product’s first retail sale. Thus, if a 
Virginian traveled to Maryland to purchase a lawn mower, Maryland 
law would determine product liability for that tool, even though the 
eventual lawn mowing accident would occur in Virginia. 
The key characteristic of this rule is that it allows a manufacturer 
to effectively calculate expected liability for each retailer’s product, 
given that the state of retail sale (unlike the state of intended 
consumption) for each product can be known in advance. This 
overcomes the Prisoner’s Dilemma, because no interstate arbitrage is 
possible. Every product sold at retail in Maryland will be subject to 
Maryland product liability law, regardless of where the consumer 
lives or uses the product. If some other state has a more pro-plaintiff 
(or pro-defendant) product liability régime, and if the purchaser 
desires the greater ex ante liability recovery (or the lower price, 
 
where the state of intended use corresponds roughly to the state of registration. On this point, 
see the discussion supra Part V.B.3. 
 244. See supra text accompanying notes 89–95. 
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respectively) that rule provides, she will have the incentive to 
purchase the product in that other state. However, under the “first 
retail sale” rule, unlike lex loci or “interest analysis,” a purchaser 
seeking high-liability protection will have to pay for it as part of the 
purchase price. She will not be able to externalize much of the cost 
of this protection to consumers in other states. This satisfies the 
equality requirement. In addition, all purchasers, from in-state and 
out-of-state, will have authorized the application of the law of the 
state of retail sale by traveling to that state to buy the product. This 
satisfies the territorial requirement. 
This rule would create a more fully autarkical product liability 
system. Consumers would choose the amount of liability protection 
they wanted and pay for that level accordingly. In addition, the 
intrinsic asymmetry of access to knowledge of the applicable liability 
rule, as between consumers and manufacturers, would diminish 
greatly due to retail competition. Retailers in high-liability states 
would have a keen incentive to explain to consumers how they 
receive greater protection (in return for a higher purchase price) 
much as current retailers of name-brand products have an incentive 
to stress the reasons why the brand they sell carries a premium price 
as compared to generics. 
Of course, consumers may not desire the protection offered 
them by a high-liability home state. Suppose, for instance, that the 
retail price includes a premium reflecting the outlays required by a 
state product liability rule that requires full compensation to 
consumers injured through their own misuse of a product. Careful 
consumers might prefer to pay less for the product in a neighboring 
state where this “protection” is not bundled into the purchase price. 
Home state retailers would lose sales to careful consumers in this 
scenario. Note, though, that if this loss does occur, retailers are well 
placed and relatively easily organized, in compliance with and in 
furtherance of the republican principle, to make political 
representations with the aim of modifying the local liability rule to 
better reflect undistorted245 consumer preferences. In this way, the 
“state of first retail sale” rule allows for input by local residents and 
channels their (otherwise diffuse and minute) interests through easy-
to-organize local merchants. The “state of first retail sale” rule 
 
 245. Undistorted consumer preferences are those that are not altered by the pathologies 
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
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actually enhances the republican principle through this channeling 
mechanism.246 
Under the “first retail sale” rule, consumers are not held captive 
by their own state’s product liability rule as is the case for the Kozyris 
proposal. Consumers could escape local rules through republican 
“voice” (by joining with local retailers and lobbying for a change of 
liability rules, as just mentioned) or through relatively inexpensive 
“exit” (by purchasing their products in another state).247 If a state 
provides more—or less—liability than residents of a given state want, 
there will be fewer retail sales in that state. Profit-maximizing 
businessmen will have an even greater incentive to join forces with 
consumers to optimize state law given the exit option. 
2. Potential problems with the rule 
a. Will producers take into account differential product liability 
laws? If the nationwide Prisoner’s Dilemma epitomized by Justice 
Neely’s approach to product liability is resolved, this field of law 
might assume a greater variety than it does at present. There is, for 
example, no particular reason to believe that New Yorkers have the 
same attitude toward collective risk-aversion as do Montanans. It 
seems likely that communities would be freer to ratify collective 
preferences under the “first retail sale” rule than they are currently. 
Current choice-of-law rules make West Virginians pay the same 
premium as New Jersey residents for the rules Garden State courts 
have fashioned, and this has led West Virginia to self-consciously 
abandon rules that its own institutions had developed. There is no 
reason why this would happen under the “first retail sale” plan. 
But if significant variations among laws across the country begin 
to occur, will producers, wholesalers, and retailers consider these 
variations when pricing their products? It is hard to see why they 
would not. Providers of goods and services already consider risks 
 
 246. Channeling of interests is a sought-after means of empowering citizens. Class actions 
are one obvious way to channel minute claims that otherwise would likely not be heard. Less 
obvious is the standing given to foreign exporters under American trade treaties. These 
corporations’ new ability to sue in U.S. court for violations of their treaty rights is in reality a 
way to channel the otherwise too-diffuse interests of American consumers. See Krauss, supra 
note 79, at 91–94. 
 247. Under the Kozyris option, the “exit” strategy is much more expensive—the 
consumer would have to move or use the product in a different state in order to fulfill this 
strategy. 
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shaped by state law whenever autarky reigns.248 There is little reason 
to believe consideration would not be given to differential product 
liability rules. 
One caveat to this prediction is required, though. If 
manufacturers respond to liability awards, not by adjusting price but 
by increasing quality control (even above efficient levels), placing 
superfluous additional warnings on products, making them absurdly 
idiot-proof, etc., then it may be prohibitively costly to adjust these 
features for each state of sale. In other words, notwithstanding the 
natural knowledge-producing laboratory that is interstate legal 
competition, prices may be “sticky” for mass-produced goods if 
returns to scale make it more efficient to standardize production 
processes than to vary price levels. In every case where this happens, 
though, a manufacturer selling redundantly safe products is 
vulnerable to effective competition by competitors who have tailored 
production to those states’ demand. If prices are “sticky” because of 
manufacturing processes, one might expect more specialized 
retailing—some products might simply not be offered in different 
states. This outcome is still autarkical, though less thoroughly so 
than if price alone were the dependent variable. 
On the other hand, it is theoretically possible that as a result of 
the adoption of a “first retail sale” rule the content of all product 
liability rules will change in the same direction. When the original 
Prisoner’s Dilemma is resolved, both prisoners change their behavior 
in identical ways—they clam up. Similarly, some increased degree of 
assumption of risk by consumers might be observed nationwide as 
inefficient over-insurance provoked by the current Prisoner’s 
Dilemma disappears. Consumer misuse might, for instance, be 
uniformly dealt with more severely than is often currently the case. If 
this occurred, products would not display different state liability 
premiums. But this uniformity would not be a flaw in the “first retail 
sale” rule any more than the prisoners’ silence would be. Rather, 
 
 248. Many obvious examples come to mind. Actuaries clearly consider different state laws 
on suicide in determining the likelihood of life insurance claims, and therefore in setting 
premiums. Different liability rules help to determine auto insurance premiums. Apartment 
rental rates charged by multi-state developers must take account of each state’s rent control 
and other related laws. Maryland’s requirement of ballistics tests with each new handgun sold 
has surely raised the sales price of handguns in that state, accounting for a drop in sales. See 
Melody Holmes, Maryland Handgun Sales Drop 8% in First Half of 2002, WASH. POST, 
August 22, 2002, at SM03. In each of these cases, legal autarky is possible (one’s zip code is 
used to determine insurance premiums; real estate is immobile; etc.). 
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uniformity would indicate that preferences for product liability rules 
are in fact consistently less risk-averse than appeared under the 
former choice-of-law rules. The current Prisoner’s Dilemma may 
merely provoke the compulsory bundling of unwanted insurance 
nationwide—if this were the case, the disappearance of this costly 
insurance would be a positive development. 
b. Will consumers understand the law they choose? Professor Bruce 
Hay argues that a “first retail sale” rule “might produce national 
liability levels that are lower than most states prefer.”249 Professor 
Hay believes that consumers systematically underestimate the risks of 
the products they purchase. Thus, they would tend to irrationally 
decide to save a little now, by choosing to purchase in low-liability 
states, only to lose a lot later when an accident occurs. What 
consumers “really” want, Hay argues, is to be obliged to pay more 
for products than they would have voluntarily chosen to do, and 
then avail themselves of the most plaintiff-friendly liability rules.250 
This is a difficult critique to rebut, relying as it does on the 
existence of counterfactuals that cannot be verified by examining free 
choices. Asymmetries of information are surely omnipresent in this 
world. But asymmetries of information are quite different from the 
basic irrationalities Professor Hay supposes to exist. Even if people 
are illogical in the way he states, they would arguably be more likely 
to understand their “true” preferences thanks to the education 
provided by differential pricing that the “first retail sale” rule 
promotes. Retailers have a strong business incentive under the “first 
retail sale” proposal to instruct purchasers on the risks and benefits 
of the varying levels of protection they are purchasing with their 
product and to convince them to act sensibly. 
Professor Hay’s assertion about consumer irrationality may be 
based on the oft-verified belief that most people underestimate low 
probability risks.251 However, in a national market competing 
retailers would have an incentive to provide consumers with 
information about the likelihood of injury from certain products. If 
differential production methods across states are not feasible because 
of design economies of scale, any disparities in accident rates will to a 
significant extent result from moral hazard problems: consumers may 
 
 249. See Hay, supra note 136, at 646. 
 250. Id. at 646. 
 251. See generally Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 199. 
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reduce their levels of caution in states that fully excuse consumer 
misuse, for instance. States with risk-averse residents will applaud 
these heightened liability rules, which will in turn increase the 
probability of accidents and the risk premiums in those states. Thus, 
residents face the correct trade-off: increased coverage in case of an 
accident in exchange for a higher probability of accidents and a 
higher price for insurance. It is entirely possible that with different 
levels of underlying aversion to risk; different states will choose 
different coverage/insurance premium combinations. These signals 
should tend to awaken any dormant risk preferences. However great 
the national irrationality, in other words, it should be minimized 
under the “first retail sale” rule. Presently, by contrast, residents of 
risk-averse states arguably purchase too much “insurance,” from an 
economic point of view because their greater coverage comes at a 
low “insurance premium” subsidized by consumers elsewhere. In 
brief, inaccurate manifestations of preferences are encouraged by the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. If Professor Hay is right that our “true” 
preferences are for copious and expensive insurance, it seems best to 
develop institutions that would not camouflage these preferences but 
would in fact encourage their accurate expression. 
Risk aversion does appear to differ among people and across 
areas. Poll after poll indicates, for example, that most Canadians 
demand a high level of expensive government protection from risks 
of illness, while most Americans are keen to assume many of those 
risks privately.252 Under the “first retail sale” proposal (unlike the 
Perlman plan, for example), states have a sizable incentive to 
promote product liability protection levels that reflect their citizens’ 
true risk aversion levels. By doing so, they promote, among other 
things, retail activity, sales tax revenues, and employment in the 
state. These incentives might arguably go a long way to overcome 
the problem of irrational ignorance complained of by Professor Hay, 
if indeed such a problem actually exists. 
c. What about correspondence contracts? When a consumer travels 
to another state to purchase a product,253 she clearly assents to that 
 
 252. See Mark A. Rothstein, Health Care: Public and Private Systems in the Americas, 17 
COMP. LAB. L.J. 612, 618–19 (1996). 
 253. Such travel is relatively inexpensive in most states. See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF THE 
CENSUS, Locations Maps: Locations of Selected Major Cities, in UNITED STATES CENSUS FOR 
2000, at http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/atlas/censr01-102.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2002). This Census report maps all of the metropolitan areas in the country. A casual 
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state’s jurisdiction in a meaningful way. What if she merely picks up a 
phone, mails a letter, or uses her computer to purchase a product 
from an out-of-state reseller? Is her submission to the foreign law as 
transparent? Is application of that state’s laws as constitutionally 
legitimate? 
These are difficult questions to answer. Consumers who purchase 
by mail order arguably know they are in some way outside the 
protection of their home state’s law—the insistence that their 
purchase not be subject to the home state’s sales tax is a nice 
illustration of their alertness to this issue.254 Presumably, federal 
regulations could oblige mail order and Internet vendors to 
prominently exhibit the name of the host state with (for Internet 
purchases) hyperlinks to federally approved summaries of that state’s 
product liability rules. This would make acquiescence to the retailer’s 
state law more informed than is, for example, currently the case for 
service contracts. That the latter are nonetheless enforceable255 
suggests that the former should perhaps be enforced as well. 
Allowing Internet merchants to identify a “first retail sale” state 
does move the proposal somewhat toward Perlman’s plan, 
however—and objections concerning territoriality and republican 
participation, analogous to those made to that plan, would apply.256 
Alternatively, federal law could mandate that the state of first retail 
sale is the state to which the mail-order or Internet product is 
shipped. Each consumer need only be familiar with the product 
liability rules governing the location of her mailing address, with 
which she would typically have territorial and political links. This 
requirement would oblige residents of a state to physically travel to a 
state other than their state of residence (in order to pick up their 
 
examination of the map reveals that every metropolitan area in 40 states and the District of 
Columbia, and some metropolitan areas in Texas, are less than a “three hours” drive from a 
state border. Only in nine states (Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Iowa, New 
Mexico, Oregon, and Washington) is the largest metropolitan area more than three hours’ 
drive from a state border. Eighty percent of the nation’s population lives in one of the forty 
states whose population centers are close to state lines. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 
Ranking Tables for States: 1990 and 2000, in UNITED STATES CENSUS FOR 2000, at 
http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/phc-t2/tab01.pdf 
 254. See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, E-Taxes: Between Cartel and Competition, 8 AEI 
FEDERALIST OUTLOOK (September 2001), at http://www.federalismproject.org/outlook/ 
9-2001.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2002). 
 255. See, e.g., ThunderWave, Inc. v. Carnival Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1562, 1564–65 (S.D. 
Fla. 1997). 
 256. See supra text accompanying notes 229–32. 
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purchased product) if they wish to avail themselves of that other 
state’s liability rules. Whether this revised solution is an advantage or 
not is debatable: “exit” by consumers dissatisfied with their home 
state’s products rule is made slightly more expensive, since mail order 
firms would be obliged to charge different prices to different zip 
codes under this scheme. On the other hand, affirmative acceptance 
of a “foreign” state’s sovereignty is easier to infer when a conscious 
act of travel is undertaken. In addition, making the “exit” option a 
bit more costly makes it more likely at the margin that a consumer 
will favor political “voice,” which would arguably help supply the 
public good of legal improvement where warranted. 
It seems likely that simplicity is best served by applying the 
liability rules of the state of delivery to mail order and Internet 
purchases. However, for orders from “brick-and-mortar” 
establishments, accompanied by physical delivery from that 
establishment to a purchaser in a nearby state, the state of the seller 
should prevail as in the original proposal. This would ensure that 
states contiguous to pro-plaintiff jurisdictions retain a powerful 
motivation to gauge the satisfaction neighboring citizens have with 
their liability rules. 
d. What about sales of used products? Countless products, from 
absinthe to zinfandel, are sold at retail only once. Other goods, such 
as lawn mowers or automobiles, are commonly resold. The “first 
retail sale” rule would continue to apply the first state of sale’s laws 
regardless of the place of resale. 
This choice-of-law rule might therefore take some buyers of 
second-hand products by surprise. On the other hand, products sold 
at the retail level more than once are in general easily engraved with 
a marking (“VA,” “MD,” etc.) identifying applicable law, perhaps 
next to their serial numbers or to their Underwriters’ Laboratories® 
logo. Second-hand purchasers are already in the habit of acquiring 
residual warranty coverage and (in the case of automobiles) 
California emissions eligibility second-hand. In both cases, the resale 
buyer takes his product with the attributes given to it at the first 
retail sale. 
It is true that the second-hand purchaser has made less of a 
commitment to the state of first retail sale, at least if it is different 
from the state of resale. But the prominence of the state marking 
does create an understanding that a previous purchaser has validly 
consented to a given state’s jurisdiction. Remember that retailers’ 
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publicity will presumably have emphasized the benefits of their 
states’ (and the costs of other states’) product liability rules. This 
diffusion of information about state product liability rules will also 
have an impact on the resale value of the product. An item governed 
by the law of a state with a short statute of repose, for example, 
might have a different resale price than an item governed by the 
product liability rule of a state without this limitation.257 Again, these 
attributes are knowable, and retailers and manufacturers will have an 
incentive to publicize them under the “first retail sale” proposal. 
e. What to do about third-party victims? Original purchasers under 
the “first retail sale” rule can be said to assent to the sovereignty of that 
state, as would, vicariously, those in privity with these purchasers. 
Second-hand purchasers, renters of the product, passengers in a car, 
family members and others knowingly transact with a purchaser. In a 
way, this purchaser can be said to have transferred her assent to a state 
product liability rule, much as is done contractually.258 What, though, 
of injured strangers? What legal structure should be applied to the New 
Jersey child, injured in New Jersey by a stone hurled from her next-
door neighbor’s cheap lawn mower, if that neighbor had traveled to 
Pennsylvania to purchase the mower (say, to benefit from lower prices 
caused by Pennsylvania’s more pro-defendant product liability rules)? 
This problem is conceptually important, but it is not empirically 
ubiquitous. The overwhelming majority of product liability plaintiffs 
are purchasers and people in privity with purchasers. All the same, in 
cases where the plaintiff is a true “stranger,” the “first retail sale” 
proposal has undeniable problems of legitimacy. It would be simply 
impermissible to apply to this injured New Jersey resident a foreign 
law to which neither that resident nor her agents have in any way 
assented. 
 
 
 
 
 257. An issue of transition exists—what about durable goods previously sold with no 
marking? Two solutions are conceivable. Lex loci delictus could be maintained for these 
products. Alternatively, all products could be deemed “sold” on the date of adoption of the 
federal choice-of-law legislation, at the location of their current owners. I prefer this second 
option, which would concededly entail short-term labeling costs but would avoid all the 
problems inherent in lex loci. 
 258. Thus, for example, second-hand purchasers are affected by existing warranty 
coverage, physical condition, contract limitations, etc. 
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The lone exception to the “first retail sale” rule, then, should be 
for true third parties. For them, lex loci delictus should apply, as it is 
the only choice-of-law rule that satisfies legitimacy requirements.259 
While true third parties constitute a small subset of product 
liability plaintiffs, their protection would be rhetorically important in 
the adoption of any legislative plan. Excluding them from the rule of 
“first retail sale” diffuses objections that the proposal is unfair. At the 
same time, the insignificant ex ante likelihood that a true stranger 
will be injured minimizes the Prisoner’s Dilemma permitted by lex 
loci. This exception to the “first retail sale” rule would not preclude 
meaningful differential pricing of products by manufacturers. After 
all, in precious few cases could upstream sellers predict that a 
product will victimize a stranger as opposed to a consumer. 
3. What federal coordination is required to make this plan work? 
The “first retail sale” choice-of-law plan is compatible with 
federalism. It fulfils what is arguably a federal constitutional duty to 
make possible true state regulation of private ordering by eliminating 
the current Prisoner’s Dilemma in product liability law. It removes 
the distortion of state law caused by the temptation to free ride on 
residents of other states, and by the resentment that other states are 
free riding. It does this while superimposing no uniform federal rule 
of liability on the laboratory of states. It allows a state’s product 
liability and general tort rules to “network” as they should. 
Nevertheless, some federal coordination will be required to make 
this choice-of-law system operational. The following areas, among 
others, must surely be addressed. 
a. Common labeling requirements. The federal government could 
mandate labeling requirements for products, establishing a consistent 
way to communicate the name of the state of first retail sale to initial 
(and, as appropriate, subsequent) purchasers. Of course, there is 
some chance this requirement would spawn a needless bureaucracy, 
as has been the case to some extent with food labeling.260 As an 
 
 259. Third parties have not submitted in any way to any legal regime other than that of 
the place of the injury. See supra notes 211–21 and accompanying text. 
 260. See generally Competitive Enterprise Institute, Health & Safety at CEI: Food 
Labeling, at http://www.cei.org/sections/section15.cfm (last visited Oct. 17, 2002); The 
Independent Institute, Theory, Evidence, and Examples of FDA Harm, at http:// 
www.fdareview.org/harm.shtml (last visited Oct. 17, 2002) (suggesting that the costs of FDA 
labeling and other requirements far outweigh the benefits). 
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alternative to a government agency, the implementing statute 
imposing the “first retail sale” choice-of-law rule might limit its 
application to products whose state identification is “clearly” labeled. 
A common law would then develop to allow interested parties to 
determine “clear” labels. This would encourage clear labeling while 
allowing manufacturers latitude in discovering efficient ways to label 
diverse products. Manufacturers have a comparative advantage over 
governments in so doing. Under a common law rule, manufacturers 
would have strong incentives to use their talents to label products in 
such a way as to trigger the federal choice-of-law rule, because the 
capacity to avoid “beggar thy neighbor” product liability rules allows 
them to price their products accurately. 
b. Rules for goods purchased abroad. Federal legislation should 
determine the law applicable to retail goods purchased abroad. 
Possibilities include the state of residence of the first purchaser and 
the country of first retail sale. The latter seems preferable: if an 
American consumer goes to Scotland to buy whiskey, we can assume 
that he has a chance to observe that one cannot successfully sue in 
Scotland on the theory (advanced occasionally in this country)261 that 
whiskey manufacturers “deliberately cause addiction” to their 
product. 
c. Expansion of federal diversity jurisdiction. It is important to 
recognize that the mere adoption of a “first retail sale” choice-of-law 
rule does not guarantee its effective enforcement. 
Suppose that a New Jersey court, to comply with the new federal 
choice-of-law rule for product liability, would have to apply 
Pennsylvania law (because a New Jersey plaintiff had traveled to 
Pennsylvania to purchase the allegedly defective product). If 
Pennsylvania law differs from the New Jersey forum’s law in a 
significant way,262 the forum court might be tempted to “misread” 
the Pennsylvania law. As explained above, the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
applies to more than just the choice of law—it concerns the 
interpretation of this law as well.263 The risk of “nullification by 
interpretation” must be contained; otherwise, manufacturers will 
 
 261. The analogous claim is, of course, popular in tobacco suits, although many courts 
have rejected it. See, e.g., Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 262. For example, New Jersey law might allow full recovery of damages when the injured 
consumer has misused the product; Pennsylvania law might deny or reduce recovery in such 
cases. 
 263. See supra, text accompanying note 116. 
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have no confidence that the choice-of-law system will be genuine. If 
this confidence is lacking, autarkical pricing will not be possible. 
Of course, a lawsuit by a New Jersey plaintiff against an out-of-
state manufacturer might be removable to federal court, which 
would be charged with applying the applicable state’s (in the 
example, Pennsylvania’s) law under Erie Railroad.264 Unfortunately, 
case law requires complete diversity for removal to be an option.265 
As a result, plaintiffs have been able to guarantee a state court forum 
by joining an in-state defendant (typically, the retailer of the 
offending product), even if they do not intend to enforce any 
judgment against the local defendant.266 Strawbridge v. Curtiss 267 
must be revised, by the Supreme Court or by federal statute, to spell 
out that federal jurisdiction exists at the option of any out-of-state 
defendant if a case is filed in state court. This modification has been 
recently approved by the House of Representatives as part of a 
federal class action reform package—the change could easily be 
extended to all products suits.268 Alternatively, or perhaps 
additionally, federal law could provide that when the forum state and 
the “first retail sale” are alleged by either party to be different states, 
there is a right of appeal from state trial court to the federal Circuit 
Court of Appeal, with a “loser pays” fees rule to discourage strategic 
behavior. 
 
 
 264. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000); see 
supra text accompanying note 77–78. 
 265. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267–68 (1806). Complete 
diversity is at most a statutory, not a constitutional, requirement. See State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967) (holding that Article III, § 2 allows 
diversity jurisdiction as long as some of the parties are diverse); see also Senate Select Comm. v. 
Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D.C. 1973) (ruling that Congress may impart as much or as little 
of the judicial power as it deems appropriate and that the Judiciary may not thereafter sua 
sponte recur to the Article III storehouse for wider jurisdiction). 
 266. See Krauss, supra note 79, at 98, for one particularly egregious example of a 
plaintiff’s abusive retention of state court jurisdiction despite diversity. The foreign defendant, 
forced before a Mississippi court because of a fictitious incomplete diversity, has treated the 
judgment against it as a violation of international law. 
 267. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). 
 268. See, e.g., H.R. 2341, 107th Cong. § 5 (2001) (allowing any defendant to remove an 
interstate class action to federal court, regardless of the presence of local codefendants and 
without the permission of codefendants). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Product liability law must be allowed to evolve as a partial 
expression of each state’s considered view of the allocation it wishes 
to make of the risks of living. Currently, states’ product liability rules 
are likely skewed toward more liability than some states (maybe even 
every state) might consider optimal were the consequences of this 
liability not externalized to others beyond state borders. Product 
liability law today is a classic Prisoner’s Dilemma. As such, it is a 
subset of tort whose rapid recent expansion both requires and 
permits a structural solution. 
Some specialists have proposed federalizing product liability law 
to resolve this dilemma. However, in addition to the harm a federal 
takeover would inflict on the traditional constitutional division of 
powers, uniformity of product liability law is undesirable for 
substantive reasons. Our ignorance about the desires of consumers, 
and the comparative advantage of expressing collective moral values 
in decentralized assemblies, make the laboratory of states a preferred 
setting for torts in general and for product liability in particular. 
Through adoption of federal choice of law, it is possible to 
resolve the Prisoner’s Dilemma while respecting substantive 
federalism. This article has sketched the reasons for such a plan, the 
variations it could take, and the best way to make it operational. 
With a federal administration and a Congress interested both in 
tort reform and federalism, it may now be possible to reconcile these 
two principles. Choice of law, a federal duty long neglected, is worth 
a serious look now. 
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